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"The work will teach you how to do it." 2

R

ecently there has been increasing popular and scholarly attention to employer efforts to limit competitive behavior
by departing employees, particularly in the high-tech sector of
the economy.3 Both the use and enforcement of noncompete
agreements 4 appear to be on the rise as employers contend with
Anonymous proverb.
Although noncompetes have always been a subject of academic debate, a significant amount of scholarship in this area has been produced during the last decade.
See, e.g., Samuel C. Damren, The Theory of "Involuntary " Contracts: The Judicial
Rewriting of Unreasonable Covenants Not to Compete, 6 TEX. WESLEYANL. REV.
71 (1999); Gillian Lester, Restrictive Covenants, Employee Training, and the Limits
of Transaction-Cost Analysis , 76 IND. L.J. 49, 56 (2001); Eric A. Posner & George
Triantis , Covenants Not to Compete from an Incomplete Contract Perspective (Oct.
20, 2000) , available at http ://www.law.uchicago .edu/Lawecon/index .html; Edward M .
Schulman, An Economic Analysis of Employee Noncompetition Agreements, 69
DEN. U. L. REV. 97 (1992); Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract:
Implications of the Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA
L. REV. 519 (2001); Andrew J. Gallo, Comment, A Uniform Rule for Enforcement of
Non-Competition Contracts Considered in Relation to "Termination Cases", 1 U. PA.
J. LAB. & EMP. L. 719 (1998). For articles focusing on the particular problems associated with the use of noncompetes in the high-tech industry, see Ronald J. Gilson,
The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley,
Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U . L. REv. 575 (1999); Hanna
Bui-Eve, Note, To Hire or Not to Hire: What Silicon Valley Companies Should
Know About Hiring Competitors ' Employees , 48 HASTINGSL.J. 981 (1997); Christine M. O'Malley , Note , Covenants Not to Compete in the Massachusetts Hi-Tech
Industry : Assessing the Need for a Legislative Solution , 79 B.U . L. REV. 1215 (1999);
Dan Messeloff, Note , Giving the Green Light to Silicon Alley Employees: No-Compete Agreements Between Internet Companies and Employees Under New York Law,
11 FORDHAMINTELL.PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 711 (2001) ; cf Alan Hyde, Working
in Silicon Valley: Economic and Legal Analysis of a High-Velocity Labor Market
(2000) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing high-tech industry's use of trade secret claims under California law to protect comparable employer
interests). Popular concern with the use of noncompetes and related issues is reflected in the frequent media attention given to employers' pursuit of litigation
against defecting employees . See, e.g., Kenneth Bredemeier , In a Bind over
Noncompete Clauses: More Workers Caught in Grip of Required Agreemems,
WASH. PosT, Mar. 18, 2000, at El ( discussing increasing frequency of such agreements and spotlighting use by Washington, D.C. area companies) ; Kelly Zito, Evolve
Claims Intimidation by Peoplesoft, S.F . CttRON., Mar. 21, 2000, at Cl (reporting on
litigation initiated by enterprise software manufacturer after eighteen employees
opted for job opportunities with competitor company).
4 This Article uses the term "noncompete"
to refer to a written agreement in
which the employee covenants not to engage in competition with the employer after
termination. See infra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. Such a provision should
be distinguished from other types of restrictive covenants , including nondisclosure
agreements (through which the employee covenants not to reveal the employer's
trade secrets or confidential information to future employers) and nonsolicitation
agreements (through which the employee covenants not to solicit either employees
or clients of the employer to participate with the employee in a future competitive
2
3

Bargaining for Loyalty in the Information Age

1165

an increasingly mobile workforce. 5 Employer reliance on such
agreements is by no means extraordinary, and companies have
attempted to protect their business interests in this manner for
centuries.6 What the current economic climate makes clear,
however, is that existing doctrine fails to address fully the inter
ests that employers are attempting to safeguard in using noncom
petes, which in turn has resulted in significant confusion in the
case law. 7 This Article elucidates the tension in existing legal
endeavor). While such additional promises frequently accompany promises not to
compete in employment agreements, this Article focuses specifically on the issues
raised by the most restrictive of these clauses, those that prohibit general competi
tion, and considers such additional covenants only briefly by analogy. For a general
explanation of the various types of restrictive covenants that may appear in an em
ployment agreement,see Bui-Eve, supra note 3, at 1000-06.
5 Evidence of the increasing use of noncompete agreements in employment con
tracts is anecdotal but prevalent. There appears to be consensus among practicing
attorneys that noncompete agreements are being more frequently requested from a
greater variety of workers and more vigorously pursued posttermination. See, e.g.,
Bredemeier, supra note 3, at El (interviewing counsel noting recent rise in use of
non-competes). An empirical study of court decisions performed by Professor Peter
Whitmore in the late 1980s determined that the number of appellate decisions in
volving noncompetition claims more than doubled between 1966 and 1988. See Pe
ter J. Whitmore, A Statistical Analysis of Noncompetition Clauses in Employment
Contracts, 15 J. CoRP. L. 483,484 n.2 (1990). More recently, Professor Katherine
Stone noted even greater increases between the early 1970s and late 1990s. See
Stone, supra note 3, at 577 n.239. It should be noted that such studies do not cap
ture noncompete cases that failed to yield a written opinion, nor instances in which
the presence of such an agreement deterred employee departure and therefore
avoided litigation entirely. For this reason, the use of noncompete agreements is
probably far more prevalent than those numbers suggest. See Charles A. Sullivan,
Revisiting the "Neglected Stepchild": Antitrust Treatment of Postemployment Re
straints of Trade, 1977 U.ILL.L.F.621, 622-23 (noting that "the number of decisions

reported constitutes only the proverbial iceberg's tip" since subsequent employers
can avoid litigation by using the employee outside the agreement's scope and be
cause "the mere existence of such clauses ...induce[s] many employees ... not to
leave their employment to begin with").
6 The first recorded instances of the use of employee noncompetition agreements
date to fifteenth and sixteenth century England when such agreements were consid
ered per se void as against public policy. See Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agree
ments Not To Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 631-32 (1960) (summarizing early
history of noncompete law). The modern rule of enforceability traces to an eight
eenth century British decision concerning the use of such a clause in a sale of busi
ness transaction. See id. at 629-31 (discussing Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep.
347,349 (Q.B. 1711)).
7 Case law on noncompetes is strikingly inconsistent, making enforceability per
haps one of the most complex, and consequently most litigated, areas of employ
ment law. See Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d
685, 687 (Ohio 1952) (describing body of precedent as "a sea-vast and vacillating,
overlapping and bewildering" out of which "[o]ne can fish ...any kind of strange
support for anything"); Whitmore, supra note 5, at 485 (noting that the ambiguity
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rules that limit enforceability of noncompetes based on particularized notions of substantive fairness, and proposes an alternative theory of enforcement focusing on substantive and
procedural issues that arise at the time noncompetes are formed.
A central concern in the law and scholarship regarding
noncompete agreements has long been the extent to which enforcement should be constrained to protect the mobility and economic freedom of workers. Due to historical concerns about
employees' lack of bargaining power, 8 courts have treated such
agreements as narrow remedial tools, designed to prevent damage to cognizable business interests, rather than as bargained-for
alterations of the default rules of the employment relationship. 9
Courts in effect require an employer to demonstrate an interest
separate and apart from its interest in retaining the departing
worker in order to obtain an injunction against competition. 10
This Article argues that such a rule relies on an unworkable distinction between the employee and his or her work product, one
which is incompatible with modern notions of the value of
human capital. Where skilled labor is scarce, employers are apt
to use noncompetes as a vehicle for retaining qualified workers
as much as for protecting proprietary information and trade
surrounding the enforceability has resulted in vast amounts of litigation and reported decisions); infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
8 See, e.g., Arthur Murray, 105 N.E.2d at 704 (noting that the employee "is often
in urgent need of selling [his labor] and in no position to object to boiler plate restrictive covenants placed before him to sign"; "[h]is individual bargaining power is
seldom equal to that of his employer"); see also Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Foti,
302 So. 2d 593, 596 (La. 1974) (noting strong public policy reason against enforcing
noncompete agreements is "disparity in bargaining power" between employee and
employer, where employee, "fearful of losing his means of livelihood ... contract[s]
away his liberty to earn his livelihood in the field of his experience"); infra notes 2629 and accompanying text.
9 The legal rules that have evolved to limit noncompete enforceability require employers to demonstrate a "legitimate" or "protectable" interest in trade secrets, confidential information or customer relations as a threshold to accessing legal
protection, and the extent of protection provided is limited to that which is reasonably necessary to safeguard the interest asserted. See generally RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 188 (1981); infra Part I.B.
10 See McGlothen v. Heritage Envtl. Servs. L.L.C., 705 N.E.2d 1069, 1072 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1999) ("[A]n employer is not entitled to protection from an employee's
knowledge, skill, or general information acquired through experience or instruction
while in the [employer's] employment."); Hasty v. Rent-A-Driver, Inc., 671 S.W.2d
471, 473 (Tenn. 1984) ("In order for an employer to be entitled to [noncompete]
protection, there must be special facts present over and above ordinary competition ... such that without the covenant not to compete the employee would gain an
unfair advantage .... "); infra Part I.B.
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secrets. As modern employment relationships become increasingly short-term and traditional notions of employee loyalty decline, employers may turn to noncompetes to enforce through
legal means shared notions of obligation and commitment that
were previously self-enforcing.
The crux of the enforceability issue therefore is the relationship between the informal norms that develop between companies and their workers and the written noncompete agreement
that purports to define the terms of employment. 11 Because of
the evolving nature of these relationships and the limited opportunities employees have to negotiate the terms of their noncompetes, there is reason to doubt that the employee's acceptance of
such an agreement constitutes a knowing assumption of the risks
of enforcement. 12 On the other hand, consideration of the parties' informal understanding diminishes the predictive value of.
written agreements and encourages employers to overreach in
the drafting stage. 13
Responding to this dilemma, this Article offers a formationbased model of enforcement that draws on basic contract principles and the rules governing enforcement of premarital agreements under domestic relations law. Like noncompetes,
premarital agreements are an attempt to control in advance the
financial consequences of the dissolution of a legal relationship,
and they have historically been subjected to comparable scrutiny
for fairness. In recent decades, the trend in evaluating the valid11 This is a central concern arising from relational contract theory, which suggests
that exchanges take place within relational patterns that influence parties' behavior
and the execution of the terms of their exchange. See, e.g., IAN R. MACNEIL, THE
NEw SocIAL CoNTRAcr (1980): Ian R. Macneil. Values in Contract: Internal and
External, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 340, (1983) (hereinafter Macneil, Values in Contract];
Paul J. Gudel, Relational Contract Theory and the Concept of Exchange. 46 BuFF. L.
REv. 763 (1998): see generally infra Part Ill.C.l. The merits of the various approaches to considering relational norms and other values that may influence contract interpretation are discussed infra in Part 111.C.2.
12 Noncompetes
generally contain boilerplate language and frequently are not
provided to the employee until after he or she begins employment. See Curtis 1000,
Inc. v. Suess, 24 F.3d 941, 943 (7th Cir. 1994) (agreement signed two weeks after
hire); Midwest Sports Mktg. v. Hillerich & Bradsby of Canada, Ltd., 552 N.W.2d
254, 259 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (same); Cent. Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram,
678 S.W.2d 28 (Tenn. 1984) (agreements of three employees signed three weeks, two
weeks, and one day after hire); cf Hopper D.V.M. v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc.,
861 P.2d 531, 536 (Wyo. 1993) (agreement signed nine months after promotion). At
that point. the employee's ability to negotiate the agreement's terms is necessarily
limited. See infra Part IV.C.
13 See infra Part 111.C.2.
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ity of premarital agreements has moved away from review of the
substantive effects of enforcement in favor of assessing the quality of the spouse's consent and the fairness of the agreement at
the time it was drafted. 14 Adopting this focus on formation in
the context of noncompetes will normalize the enforcement of
these agreements from the perspective of contract law. Ideally, it
will also force parties to view such documents as binding contractual alternatives to informal relationships and consequently encourage them to enter into such agreements with caution and
forethought.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I contains an overview of noncompete law and explains the evolution of the existing legal rules for determining enforceability. Part II critically
considers the protectable interest requirement, the key doctrinal
tool for assessing the fairness of noncompete agreements. It asserts that this approach fails to effectively address employers' interest in human capital or provide a workable standard for
enforcement. Part III recharacterizes the employer's interest in
using noncompete agreements as an interest in its workers. That
usage may be justified as a means of protecting the employer's
investment in employee development or of enforcing an implicit
exchange of training and experience for spot commitments to
particular projects. At the same time, such usage creates opportunities for employers to reach beyond the terms of the parties'
shared understanding that cannot easily be resolved through judicial modification of the written agreement. Part IV explains
the developing law of premarital agreements and proposes a formation-based model of noncompete enforceability. The new
model limits judicial consideration of circumstances surrounding
enforcement, focusing instead on the legitimacy of the parties'
bargaining process, the quality of their exchange, and the reasonableness of the terms as of the time of drafting.

14 See UNIF. PREMARITALAGREEMENTAcr § 6, 9C U.L.A. 376 (2001) (providing
that a premarital agreement is enforceable unless it was not executed voluntarily, or
was unconscionable at the time it was formed and the party opposing enforcement
did know of or receive fair disclosure of his or her partner's assets); see also infra
Part IV.B.
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I
FROM

POLICY

TO DOCTRINE:
LIMITATIONS

NONCOMPETE

SUBSTANTIVE
ON

ENFORCEABILITY

A noncompete is a written 15 agreement in which an employee
covenants at the outset 16 of the employment relationship that he
or she will refrain from competing with the employer in specified
ways for a period of time following the termination of the rela15 Only a small minority of states recognize oral noncompete agreements. See,
e.g., Metcalfe Invs., Inc. v. Garrison, 919 P.2d 1356, 1362 (Alaska 1996). Enforceable restraints are almost always in writing and some jurisdictions so require. See,
e.g., ChemiMetals Processing , Inc . v. McEneny, 476 S.E.2d 374, 376 (N.C. Ct. App.
1996); Geritrex Corp. v. DermaRite Indus., 910 F. Supp. 955, 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
In recent years, however , courts have held as a matter of trade secret law that, despite the absence of a noncompete agreement, an employer may be entitled to an
injunction preventing competition in limited situations where any competitive employment by the employee would lead to disclosure. See Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond .
54 F.3d 1262, 1271 (7th Cir. 1995) (enjoining employee from working where employment by competitor would inevitability lead to disclosure of trade secret distribution
systems and marketing strategies used in plaintiffs ' sports beverage business): Merck
& Co . v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp . 1443, 1460 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (applying inevitable disclosure theory to enjoin future employment where employee 's new job at drug company would involve same duties and require disclosure of former employer's supply
agreements and projected product launch date). But see Bayer Corp. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1120 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (holding that "California trade-secrets law does not recognize the theory of inevitable disclosure; indeed,
such a rule would run counter to the strong public policy in California favoring employee mobility "); Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co .. 148 F. Supp. 2d
1326, 1337 (S.D . Fla . 2001) (noting that " [a]bsent evidence of actual or threatened
misappropriation , a court should not allow a(n) (employer] to use inevitable disclosure as an after-the-fact noncompete agreement to enjoin an emplo yee from working for the employer of his or her choice") .
16 Despite the fact that the employee frequently does not sign the agreement until
after he or she begins working , see supra note 12. most court s have held that the
offer of continued employment constitutes consideration for the employee's promise. See, e.g., Curtis 1000, Inc., 24 F.3d at 945 (finding that third noncompete covenant signed sixteen years after initial employment was supported by consideration
because employee salesman was retained for an additional eight years); Abel v. Fox,
654 N.E .2d 591, 593 (111.App . Ct. 1995) (finding that "(c]ontinued employment constitutes adequate consideration for a post-employment covenant not to compete "
signed in 1990 after employment had begun earlier that same year) . In instances in
which the agreement is requested long after employment commences, however ,
some courts require that the employee receive some increase in compensation , authority , or benefits to support the employee 's promise . See , e.g. , Freeman v. Duluth
Clinic, Ltd., 334 N.W.2d 626,630 (Minn . 1983) (holding that noncompete agreement
signed by employee two years after beginning employment and months after receiving a new promotion was invalid because employer offered no new consideration
such as a pay raise, new promotion , or other benefit).
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tionship. 17 While such ·agreements conform to contractual formalities, they are governed by a unique system of rules that
substantially constrain their enforceability based on principles of
substantive fairness. Due to normative concerns about employees' ability to bargain effectively and the potential impact of such
agreements on employees' economic freedom, courts have restricted the use of noncompetes to the protection of discrete business interests that can be demonstrated at the time enforcement
is sought. The following section briefly explores the policy issues
underlying questions of enforceability and explains their doctrinal legacy.
A.

Themes, Standards, and the Problem of Competing Policies

In assessing a request for injunctive relief pursuant to a
noncompete agreement, a court is explicitly or implicitly balancing fundamental principles: freedom of contract, respect for personal autonomy, protection of the economic mobility of
individuals, and, of course, the desire to enhance economic development in a manner that will benefit society as a whole. 18 On
the one hand, noncompetes can be seen as legal tools necessary
to preserve key business interests and relationships. 19 On the
other hand, they may be considered tools of oppression, non-negotiable covenants imposed by employers that essentially inden17 For sample noncompete clauses see GALE R. PETERSON,TRADE SECRETPRoTECrION IN AN INFORMATIONAGE C-53, C-63 (1997).
18 See Blake, supra note 6, at 626-27 (summarizing key policy concerns underlying
issues of noncompete enforceability).
19 See, e.g., Prudential Sec., Inc. v. Plunkett. 8 F. Supp. 2d 514, 519 (E.D. Va.
1998) (recognizing "that a company spending a great deal of time and money cultivating clients may see its efforts destroyed when a former broker violates a restrictive covenant and solicits his former company's clients"); PSC, Inc. v. Reiss, 111 F.
Supp. 2d 252, 256 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that employers have an interest in
preventing the employee from working for a competitor's company where "the transient employee possesses highly confidential or technical knowledge concerning
manufacturing processes, marketing strategies, or the like"); Darugar v. Hodges, 471
S.E.2d 33, 36 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that employer had the "right to protect
itself from the risk that the former employee might use contacts ... cultivated [while
employed] to unfairly appropriate customers"); BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 712
N.E.2d 1220, 1225 (N.Y. 1999) (finding a legitimate interest "in preventing former
employees from exploiting or appropriating the goodwill of a client or customer,
which had been created and maintained at the employer's expense, to the employer's competitive detriment"); Reed. Roberts Assocs., Inc. v. Strauman, 353
N.E.2d 590. 593 (N.Y. 1976) (recognizing "the legitimate interest an employer has in
safeguarding that which his business made successful and to protect himself against
deliberate surreptitious commercial piracy").
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ture the employee to a single master. 20
Historically, the dominant concern has been the risk of depriving individual employees of their ability to earn a living. During
the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, courts sought to protect apprentices, who purchased their training and license to trade
through the guild system, by preventing masters from extending
the requisite period of servitude through the use of restrictive
covenants .21 The dominance of the apprenticeship system as a
means of entering a trade combined with the relative difficulty of
traveling outside one's town or village made even narrow geographic limitations on postemployment competition particularly
onerous. 22 Thus, the earliest recorded cases voided such agreements as unfair restraints of trade. 23
The idea that all such restraints are invalid gave way to a more
tempered approach by the early part of the eighteenth century.
In Mitchel v. Reynolds ,24 an English court held that a limited restraint on future competition pursuant to a sale-of-business
agreement could be valid where it was supported by good consideration under circumstances appearing just and honest. In so deciding, the court identified the concerns which ultimately formed
the basis of the modern rule: the possible loss to the promisor of
his or her means of earning a living, the danger of corporate monopolization, and the potential loss to society of the services of
one of its members. 25 Although the case involved a covenant ancillary to a sale of a business rather than an employment con20 See , e.g. , Prudemial Sec. , 8 F. Supp . 2d at 519 (characterizing covenant not to
compete as a "contract of adhesion " that must be strictly construed against enforcement): Vortex Protective Serv . v. Dempsey , 463 S.E .2d 67, 69 (G a. Ct. App. 1995)
(noting that noncompete agr eements " injure the [employees) making them, diminish
th e ir means of procuring live lihoods and a competency for their families [and] ...
deprive [them] of the power to mak e future acquisitions , and expo se them to imposition and oppression"); Bennet v. Storz Broad. Co., 134 N.W.2d 892, 898 (Minn.
1965) (holding that noncompete agreements "are looked upon with disfavor, cautiously considered, and carefully scrutinized").
2 1 See Blake, supra note 6, at 632-39 (describing history of noncompete
use in
England and treatment und e r British common law).
22 See id. at 632.
23 See generally id. at 631-32 (summarizing first four known recorded decisions
from 1414 through sixteenth century) . Another explanation for the case holdings of
this period is that courts were motivated to preserve the structures of the existing
guild system: thus the voiding of such agreements can be characterized as a conservative effort to preserve the social status quo as opposed to a progressive move to
protect workers. Id. at 632 .
24 24 Eng. Rep. 347, 349 (Q .B. 1711 ).
25 See id. at 350.
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tract, the court noted in dicta the peculiar risks of applying such
covenants in the employment setting: It expressed concern that
abusive masters might utilize such agreements to prevent employees from engaging in legitimate competition at the end of
their period of servitude. 26 Thus, in upholding the sale-of-business covenant before it, the court opened the door to enforceability of comparably worded covenants between employer and
employee and at the same time raised the key policy concerns
that would constrain judicial enforcement in future cases. 27
The Mitchel v. Reynolds "rule of reason," as it has come to be
called, ultimately formed the standard to be used in analyzing
both sale-of-business and employee noncompete agreements. It
was adopted by American courts and to this day characterizes
the dominant judicial approach to enforceability. 28 So too has
the social rhetoric of court decisions remained focused on the
protection of individual workers. Modern courts routinely appeal to employees' lack of bargaining power in rendering a deci26 See id. (recognizing that masters were liable to "give their apprentices much
vexation on this account, and to use many indirect practices to procure such bonds
from them, lest they should prejudice them in their custom, when they come to set
up for themselves").
27 The distinction between agreements not to compete in employment contracts
and those incorporated in contracts to sell a business remains viable, the latter type
generally being viewed more favorably by courts and legislatures. See, e.g. , CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CooE §§ 16600-16602.5 (West 1997) (declaring all contracts in restraint of trade void except those ancillary to the sale of a business or business interest or the dissolution of a partnership); Baker's Aid v. Hussmann Foodservice Co.,
730 F. Supp. 1209, 1214 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (noting that restrictive covenants ancillary
to the sale of a business are "routinely enforced" whereas those appearing in employment agreements are "'rigorously examined'"). The distinction is based in part
on the assumption that the promisor in the sale of business context will likely have
greater bargaining power than an ordinary employee. See Watson v. Waffle House,
324 S.E.2d 175, 177 (Ga. 1985) ("[A] contract of employment inherently involves
parties of unequal bargaining power to the extent that the result is often a contract
of adhesion ... [while] a contract for the sale of a business interest is far more likely
to be one entered into by parties on equal footing."); see also Blake, supra note 6, at
648. It also reflects recognition of the fact that a business owner's ability to sell a
going concern would be seriously undercut if he or she could not promise to refrain
from future competition. See id. at 646 ("A transfer of good will cannot be effectively accomplished without an enforceable agreement by the transferor not to act
so as unreasonably to diminish the value of that which he is selling.").
28 See, e.g., Mattis v. Lally, 82 A.2d 155, 156 (Conn. 1951); Ricou v. Crosland, 88
So. 380, 381 (Fla. 1921); Rakestraw v. Lanier, 30 S.E. 735, 737 (Ga. 1898); People v.
Sheldon, 34 N.E. 785, 789 (N.Y. 1893); Queen Ins. Co. v. State, 24 S.W. 397, 400
(Tex. 1893); see generally Maureen B. Callahan, Post-Employment Restraint Agreements: A Reassessment, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 709 (1985) (noting that the Mitchel
v. Reynolds rule "has survived virtually unchanged to the present day").
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sion against noncompete enforcement. As stated by an Ohio
court in the oft-cited Arthur Murray v. Witter decision:
The average, individual employee has little but his labor to sell
or to use to make a living. He is often in urgent need of selling
it and in no position to object to boiler plate restrictive covenants placed before him to sign. To him, the right to work and
support his family is the most important right he possesses.
His individual bargaining power is seldom equal to that of his
employer. 29

Thus, while courts in the vast majority of jurisdictions have
taken the position that noncompete agreements are enforceable
if reasonable,3° they have done so with reluctance. Courts consequently assess enforceability questions from a deeply ingrained
point of view that noncompetes are the product of coerced agreement and will in most cases detrimentally curtail the individual
worker's freedom to earn a living.

B.

Rules, Thresholds, and the Requirement of a
Protectable Interest

The legacy of these historical policy concerns manifests in the
current doctrinal test for evaluating the substantive fairness of
noncompete agreements. While concerns about bargaining
power often underscore judicial decisions, the doctrinal analysis
courts utilize eschews questions of contract formation in favor of
examination of the purposes and effects of the covenant. 31 Ac29 Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland, Inc. v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 703
(Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1952); see also PSC Inc. v. Reiss, 111 F. Supp. 2d 252, 257
(W.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that "no restrictions should fetter an employee's right to
apply to his own best advantage the skills and knowledge acquired by the overall
experience of his previous employment"); Prudential Sec., Inc. v. Plunkett, 8 F.
Supp. 2d 514,519 (E.D. Va. 1998) (finding that "[g]iven the inequality of bargaining
power, [employee] could not request ... the contract be changed without risking
denial of employment"); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Foti, 302 So. 2d 593, 596 (La.
1974) (noting a strong public policy reason against enforcing noncompete agreements is "disparity of bargaining power" between employee and employer, where
employee, "fearful of losing his means of livelihood ... contract[s] away his liberty
to earn his livelihood in the field of his experience").
30 A limited number of states refuse to enforce noncompetes
in employment
agreements or place substantial additional limits on their usage. See CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1997); Cow. REv. STAT. § 8-2-113 (2001) (providing
limited protection for trade secrets, recovery of expenses for training or educating,
and executive and management personnel, officers, and their professional staff);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (1987).
31 For instance, courts will rarely examine the consideration supporting a noncompete agreement, presuming that the offer of employment itself is sufficient, see supra
note 16, and despite the rhetoric of unequal bargaining power, courts almost never
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cording to the classic formulation in the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, a covenant not to compete is "unreasonably in restraint of trade," and hence unenforceable, where (1) "the restraint is greater than what is needed to protect the promissee's
legitimate interests" or (2) the promissee's need is outweighed by
hardship to the promisor or the public at large. 32 In essence, the
Restatement provision reflects not a "rule" of reasonableness so
much as a standard by which courts can achieve a balance of interests.33 A court must weigh the needs of the employer, characterized as its "legitimate" or "protectable" interests, against the
gravity of the restriction placed on the mobility and economic
freedom of the employee. 34 Oddly, its function is to consider not
inquire into the quality of the employee's consent. Cf. Stewart E. Sterk, Restraints
on the Alienation of Human Capital, 79 VA. L. REV. 383, 409 (1993) (noting that
courts apply the "reasonableness" test even in situations involving sophisticated parties bargaining at arms' length with the assistance of counsel). The viability of an
approach to noncompete enforceability based on close scrutiny of the formation
process is discussed at length in Part V, infra.
3 2 RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 188 (1981).
33 See ALTA Analytics, Inc. v. Muuss, 75 F. Supp. 2d 773, 784 (S.D. Ohio 1999)
(noting that the applicable state law "has eschewed a bright line rule in favor of an
overall standard of 'reasonableness,' that enables courts to consider all factors relevant to the contract and to 'fashion a contract' that is reasonable based on the facts
of the case"); see generally CAROL M. RosE, PROPERTYAND PERSUASION: EssA YS
ON THE HISTORY, THEORY AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP200 (1994) (characterizing the movement away from "clear, open-and-shut demarcations of entitlement" to
"fuzzy, ambiguous rules of decision," often based on principles of equity or reasonableness, as a "substitution of 'mud' rules for 'crystal' ones").
34 In precise accordance with the Restatement
rule, some jurisdictions also consider the damage to society that may result from the loss of the employee's services.
See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith Inc. v. de Liniere, 572 F. Supp. 246, 249
(N.D. Ga. 1983) (noting that "the public has little interest in having its choice restricted to brokers other than the one who has served them" in denying an injunction barring broker from serving his former clients); Liautaud v. Liautaud, 221 F.3d
981, 988 (7th Cir. 2000) (voiding noncompete agreement restricting employee from
opening a sandwich shop anywhere in the world because it injured the public as a
whole by permanently depriving the public of employee's sandwich shop and stifling
competition). However, in most cases, courts do not treat societal interest as a factor to be considered separately from its two-step inquiry assessing protectable interest and reasonableness of scope. See Milton Handler & Daniel E. Lazaroff,
Restraint of Trade and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv.
669, 717-20 (1982) (suggesting that public injury was used by the common law
merely to invalidate covenants or agreements where no protectable interest was
shown, and not as a separate requirement to be factored into every decision which
analyzes the reasonableness of the restriction); Lester, supra note 3, at 56 (explaining that public interests are most often adversely affected when the restrictions are
not reasonable in scope). Those limited instances where societal interest is given
distinct attention tend to involve highly specialized employees engaged in essential
services. See Merrill Lynch, 572 F. Supp. at 249 (noting that "[a] stock broker stands
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so much the language of the covenant or traditional contract defenses, but the operation of the covenant in relation to the situation in which its enforcement is sought. 35
This balancing of interests takes place within a developed doctrinal framework that contains specified prerequisites to enforcement. At the threshold, employers must show that they have an
underlying interest that the law is willing to recognize. Employers have no right to enforce a noncompete merely for purposes
of indenturing an employee to his or her current post, nor any
right to prevent competition per se. 36 To avoid unfair effects on
employees and competitors, courts require the presence of special interests or circumstances that justify a restriction. 37 If there
in a different relationship to his customers from that of other kinds of salesman"
because "of the important role of the broker in protecting the financial welfare of
his clients"); Carter-Shields v. Alton Health Inst., 739 N.E.2d 569, 577 (111.App. Ct.
2000) (finding agreement restricting physician from practicing medicine within a
twenty-mile radius unenforceable as against public policy because it would "deprive
at least some patients of an on going relationship with the physician of their
choice").
35 See Stone, supra note 3, at 578 (noting that the law of noncompete enforceability "occupies a peculiar legal never-never land, somewhere between contract and
tort, in which party consent and externally imposed obligation are intimately but
complexly intertwined").
36 See Davis v. Albany Area Primary Health Care, Inc., 503 S.E.2d 909, 912 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the "avoidance of competition is not a legitimate business interest sufficient to justify such an uncertain geographic limitation" as the one
imposed on employee physician); Hasty v. Rent-A-Driver. Inc., 671 S.W.2d 471, 473
(Tenn. 1984) ("[A]ny competition by a former employee may well injure the business of the employer. An employer, however, cannot by contract restrain ordinary
competition.").
3 7 See, e.g., Hapney v. Central Garage, Inc .. 579 So. 2d 127, 130 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1991) (noting in support of the protectable interest rule that "all consumers
benefit from the availability of goods and services, the quality and price of which are
determined by fair competition, unfettered by artificial monopolistic practices");
Vortex Protective Serv., Inc. v. Dempsey, 463 S.E.2d 67. 69 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).
The Vortex court noted that unreasonable employee restraints
"tend to deprive the public of services of [citizens] in the employments and
capacities in which they may be most useful to the community ... , discourage industry and enterprise, and diminish the products of ingenuity and
skill; prevent competition and enhance prices, and expose the public to all
the evils of monopoly."
Id. (quoting Rakestraw v. Lanier, 30 S.E. 735, 738 (Ga. 1898)); Reed, Roberts Assoc., Inc. v. Strauman, 353 N.E.2d 590, 593 (N.Y. 1976) (expressing distrust of
noncompete agreements because "our economy is premised on the competition engendered by the uninhibited flow of services, talent and ideas"); Hasty, 671 S.W.2d
at 473 ("In order for an employer to be entitled to [noncompete] protection. there
must be special facts present over and above ordinary competition ... such that
without the covenant not to compete the employee would gain an unfair
advantage.").
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is no such interest identified, or if the interest is judged insufficient, enforcement is denied.
Those interests that satisfy this test and constitute "protectable" employer interests fall into two doctrinal categories: interests in customer relationships or business goodwill 38 and interests
in confidential or secret business information. 39 The classic scenario implicating the customer relationship interest is the salesperson or customer account representative.
Where an
employee's primary function is to market products to clients, a
reasonable covenant preventing that employee from marketing
comparable products in the same geographical area on behalf of
a competitor is generally enforceable. 40 In such situations the
law recognizes that the employer is neither attempting to indenture the employee nor restrain legitimate competition, but rather
is seeking to prevent the employee from departing with the customer base that the employer developed.
38 See, e.g., Farr Assocs., Inc. v. Baskin, 530 S.E.2d 878, 881 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000)
(finding employer consulting firm had a legitimate interest in protecting its customer
base where employee was a behavioral consultant for large companies who developed close relationships with employee and would be inclined to take their business
with the departing employee); Mertz v. Pharmacists Mut. Ins. Co., 625 N.W.2d 197,
204 (Neb. 2001) (finding employer had legitimate interest in protecting its customer
goodwill because employee was the "only [salesman] in most of Nebraska for three
years ... and would have had the opportunity to appropriate [customers]"); BDO
Seidman v. Hirshberg, 712 N.E.2d 1220, 1225 (N.Y. 1999) (noting that "[t]he employer has a legitimate interest in preventing former employees from exploiting or
appropriating the goodwill of a client or customer, which had been created and
maintained at the employer's expense, to the employer's competitive detriment").
39 See, e.g., Comprehensive Tech. Int'I, Inc. v. Software Artisans, Inc., 3 F.3d 730,
739 (4th Cir. 1993) ("When an employee has access to confidential and trade secret
information crucial to the success of the employer's business, the employer has
strong interests in enforcing a covenant not to compete because other legal remedies
often prove inadequate."); Earthweb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 312
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting that noncompetes are enforceable '"to the extent necessary
(I) to prevent an employee's solicitation or disclosure of trade secrets, [and] (2) to
prevent an employee's release of confidential information regarding employer's customers"') (quoting Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 173 F.3d 63, 70 (2d Cir. 1999)).
4 Cases which are particularly convincing to courts are those in which the product
sold is fungible or where it is easy for the customer to mistake the sales person with
the actual employer. See, e.g., Diversified Fastening Sys., Inc. v. Rogge, 786 F. Supp.
1486, 1489 (N.D. Iowa 1991) (noting that the products sold in the concrete fastener
industry were fungible and, therefore, "direct contact with customers by a company's sales force and the relationship between the sales force and the customer are
the most important factors in making sales"); McGlothen v. Heritage Envtl. Servs.,
L.L.C., 705 N.E.2d 1069, 1073 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (recognizing as protectable goodwill employee's direct contact with customers, where employee was a salesman for a
waste management company and admitted customers regarded him as the
employer).

°
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The interest in so-called proprietary information is more complicated. Courts have consistently held that employers cannot
possess a protectable interest in an employee's general skills or
know-how. 41 To legitimize a noncompete agreement based on
business information, an employer must do more than simply
supply the employee with general training or experience; it must
demonstrate that the employee was privy to trade secrets or
other confidences. 42 The modern concept of a trade secret encompasses any information which endows the holder with a competitive advantage and which is not generally known or available
within the industry. 43 Thus, under varying circumstances, customer lists, pricing methods, marketing strategies, product specifications, costs, and profit margins have been held to constitute
protectable interests justifying a postemployment restraint. 44
4 1 See, e.g., McGlothen, 705 N.E.2d at 1072 ("[ A )n employer is not entitled to
protection from an employee's knowledge, skill, or general information acquired
through experience or instruction while in the [employer's) employment."); Carolina
Chem. Equip. Co. v. Muckenfuss, 471 S.E.2d 721, 724 (S.C. Ct. App. 1996) ("One
who has worked in a particular field cannot be compelled to erase from his mind all
of the general skills, knowledge and expertise acquired through his experience.").
The distinction between general knowledge and confidential information is discussed more fully in Part II.A, infra.
42 Compare BABN Techs. Corp. v. Bruno, Civ. A. No. 98-3409, 1998 WL 720171,
at *6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 2, 1998) (finding sequencing strategy and product information
of employer's lottery company was protectable as confidential information "despite
its lack of status as trade secret"), with Dyer v. Pioneer Concepts, Inc., 667 So. 2d
961, 964 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (finding no protectable interest in employee
training because sending employee on seminars and training employee to do general
skills associated with floor stripping did not provide employee with "any unique or
specialized training"); see also Hapney v. Cent. Garage, Inc., 579 So. 2d 127, 132
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (finding no protectable interest where employee learned
to repair cruise control units and cellular telephones because such training did not
"go[ ) beyond what is usual, regular, common, or customary in the industry"). The
distinction between general skill training and trade secrets is discussed more fully in
Part II.B, infra.
43 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETSACT§ 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990);
see also Gold Messenger, Inc. v. McGuay, 937 P.2d 907, 911 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997)
(defining trade secret as "the whole or any portion or phrase of any scientific or
technical information, design, process, procedure, formula, improvement, confidential business or financial information ... or other information relating to any business or profession which is secret and of value"); Carolina Chem. Equip. Co., 471
S.E.2d at 724 ("A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's business and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it."); see
infra Part II.A.
44 See, e.g., Lumex, Inc. v. Highsmith, 919 F. Supp. 624, 629-30 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)
(finding "Cybex prototypes of new and future equipment, including manufacturing
costs and pricing structure, sales training, projected release dates and projected life
span" to be confidential information not generally known outside of the company);
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Assuming that an employer is able to demonstrate a protectable interest in one of these two ways, 45 the employer must then
show that the terms of the covenant are reasonable under the
circumstances, This reasonableness inquiry focuses on three elements: the temporal duration of the restraint, the geographic
boundaries in which the employee is prevented from engaging in
competitive employment, and the scope of the covenant, meaning the way in which competitive employment violative of the
agreement is defined. 46 If the covenant is broader in these respects than what is deemed necessary to protect the employer's
Centro!, Inc. v. Morrow, 489 N.W.2d 890, 894 (S.D. 1992) (finding that agricultural
consulting company's customer lists, revenue reports, financial statements, patron
survey forms, soil test results and crop consulting data were confidential information
which could be protected by a noncompete).
45 Some jurisdictions also recognize a protectable interest where the services of
the employee are in some way unique, such as where the employee is a well-known
artist, athlete or performer. See Borg-Warner Protective Servs. Corp. v. Guardsmark, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 495, 501 (E.D. Ky. 1996) (recognizing employer interest in
employees "possessing special, unique, or extraordinary qualifications ... [like]
newspaper writers and reporters; actors and actresses; singers; music teachers; [and]
professional athletes"). However, this interest has been confined to narrow circumstances where it is the name of the defendant, not just the work he or she provides,
that makes performance valuable, such that the employee's persona is a form of
employer goodwill. See, e.g., MTV Networks v. Fox Kids Worldwide, Inc., No.
605580/97, 1998 WL 57480, at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 4, 1998) (finding defendant was
"unique employee" due to his role as master of ceremonies for presentations to
future advertisers and media persons and was perceived as the "'public face' of
MTVN"). Even so, such cases usually involve the presence of other forms of protectable interests, like confidential information, in addition to unique services. See
Nigra v. Young Broad. of Albany, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 848, 849 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998)
(noting that '"unique services' is a very slim reed which has never actually served as
the sole basis for judicial enforcement of an anti-competition clause").
46 There is a sliding scale relationship between these considerations; that is, the
more narrowly the document is drawn in one area, the more tolerant a court will be
of other more broadly worded elements. See, e.g., Am. Software USA. Inc. v.
Moore, 448 S.E.2d 206, 207 (Ga. 1994) (noting that as the category of customers the
employer is trying to protect becomes more narrow, the need for a defined territorial restriction becomes less necessary); Farr Assocs., Inc. v. Baskin, 530 S.E.2d 878,
881 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) ("Although either the time or the territory restriction,
standing alone, may be reasonable, the combined effect of the two may be unreasonable. A longer period of time is acceptable where the geographic restriction is relatively small, and vice versa."). Thus, where the scope of competitive behavior can be
limited, modern courts have shown a willingness to uphold national or even international geographic restraints, previously considered void, in recognition of the legitimacy of corporate interests extending beyond conventional boundaries in the
increasingly globalized marketplace. See, e.g., Superior Consulting Co. v. Walling,
851 F. Supp. 839, 847 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (finding absence of any geographic term
acceptable where former employer did business in forty-three states and with foreign nations and scope of competitive behavior could be reduced): Farr Assocs.,
Inc .. 530 S.E.2d at 882 (rejecting argument that covenant was overly broad due to
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legitimate interests, the court will, in most jurisdictions, redraft
or "blue-pencil" the provision to accommodate what it perceives
as the needs of the employer in light of the anticipated effect of
the restraint on the employee's ability to earn a livelihood. 47
Thus, the modern approach to noncompete agreements is one
of limited enforceability pursuant to distinct doctrinal specifications. The policy concerns historically in tension within this area
of law are given voice in a two-step test requiring the employer
to demonstrate special circumstances that legitimize its use of the
agreement. This approach recognizes discrete interests as permissible, largely because they are deemed reflective of what is
considered to be employer property. 48 In the absence of threshabsence of defined territorial limit where scope of covenant was limited to servicing
clients of former employer).
47 There are three approaches to the problem of noncompetes that are overbroad
in scope , duration , or geographic limitation. Some courts will uphold the agreement
provided it can delete, or "blue-pencil ," the unreasonable portion of the agreement.
See , e.g. , Licocci v. Cardinal Assocs ., Inc., 445 N. E.2d 556, 561-62 (Ind . 1983); Dixie
Parking Serv. v. Hargrove , 691 So. 2d 1316, 1320-21 (La . Ct. App . 1997) (blue-penciling agreement 's geographic scope by deleting nine listed parishes and retaining
only the two parishes where employer currently operated) . Oth ers are willing to
redraft the agreement entirely to create a reasonable restraint even if the offending
portion of the agreement cannot be grammatically severed from the whole. See,
e.g., Marshall v. Gore, 506 So. 2d 91, 92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App . 1987) (redrafting agreement that prohibited employee from working for any computer software business to
create prohibition against working for a competitor of employer) ; Raimonde v. Van
Vlerah , 325 N.E.2d 544, 546-47 (Ohio 1975) (rejecting the 'blue-pencil ' doctrine as
overly strict because "the entire contract fails if offending provisions cannot be
stricken ," and choosing to modify the contract in such a way that both parties would
find reasonable) . A minority of courts decline to revise overbroad agreements entirely, and simply find them unenforceable if they overreach in any way. See , e.g. ,
Harville v. Gunter , 495 S.E.2d 862. 864 (Ga. Ct. App . 1998); Mid-States Paint &
Chem. Co v. Herr, 746 S.W.2d 613. 616 (Mo . Ct. App. 1988) (noting that "if the
contract contains no specifically expressed time or geographic al limitations the court
may not write into the contract any such limitations but must declare the entire
provision void"); see generally Callahan, supra note 28, at 710 (describing the three
approaches and discussing their prevalence).
48 Of course , if the employee is appropriating that which is considered employer
property , the conduct would be actionable under tort law irrespective of the
noncompete agreement. Thus , it has sometimes been suggested that an interpretation of noncompete law that limits protection based on principles of ownership unnecessaril y duplicates existing law. As discussed in Part II.A , infra , a strong
argument can be made that extant case law on noncompete e nforceability in fact
recognizes employer interests beyond those protectable through claims of misappropriation of trade secrets and violations of the employee duty of loyalty . See infra
note 84 and accompanying text. However, even assuming the rights are coextensive
under these regimes. noncomp etes are still valuable to employers in that they offer a
preventive remedy. Tort law requires that the employer demonstrate actual or
threatened misappropriation. which can be difficult to prove and which requires the
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old circumstances, such as employee access to proprietary business information, it is considered likely that the employer is using
the covenant for an improper purpose or is exploiting the employee.49 Thus, the primary purpose of the protectable interest
requirement is to screen legitimate from illegitimate uses of
noncompetes, while the reasonableness inquiry ensures that the
restraint requested does not reach beyond that which is necessary for protection of those limited interests. 50
II
DISTINGUISHING
PRODUCT:

BETWEEN
AN

PROTECTABLE

WORKER

ASSESSMENT
INTEREST

AND WORK
OF THE

MODEL

A starting point for assessing the effectiveness of the current
doctrinal approach is the universal uncertainty that exists among
both lawyers and laypeople as to whether and when a court will
deem a given covenant enforceable. Noncompete law is an area
fraught with ambiguity stemming not from the absence of authoremployer to suffer the disclosure it wishes to avoid by applying for relief. See, e.g. ,
Comprehensive Techs. Int'I, Inc. v. Software Artisans, Inc., 3 F.3d 730, 736 (4th Cir.
1993) (finding evidence of short development time and lack of documentation in
former employees' creation of competitive software product insufficient to demonstrate unlawful copying and denying plaintiff's misappropriation of trade secret
claim); Eden Hannon & Co. v. Sumitomo Trust & Banking Co., 914 F.2d 556, 561-62
(4th Cir. 1990) (noting that because judges will not issue injunctions until disclosure
is imminent or has already occurred, the former employee "tends to get 'one free
bite' at the trade secret"). A noncompete entitles the employer to an immediate
injunction provided the mere existence of a trade secret or confidential information
is established. See id. at 561-62 (suggesting that employers often request such agreements to avoid onerous proof requirements associated with seeking an injunction
against trade secret disclosure).
49See, e.g., Reed, Roberts Assocs., Inc. v. Strauman, 353 N.E.2d 590, 594 (N.Y.
1976) (finding that "real purpose" of noncompete was "to prevent any voluntary
withdrawals from the firm and compel active partners who came in with clients ...
to remain with the firm indefinitely" and agreement therefore "savored of
servitude").
50 It should be noted that despite the precision of the doctrine, courts do not always conform clearly to these distinct steps in rendering their analyses. See Edward
M. Schulman, 69 DENY. U. L. REV. 97, 98 (1992) (observing that while courts purport to utilize a multistep test, "any consideration of hardship to the employee and
injury to the public is usually subsumed by the analysis of the employer's protectable
interest"); Gary P. Kohn, Comment, A Fresh Look: Lowering the Mortality Rate of
Covenants Not to Compete Ancillary to Employment Contracts and to Sale of Business Contracts in Georgia, 31 EMORY L.J. 635, 646 (1982) (suggesting that courts
often inappropriately disregard the threshold requirement that the employer
demonstrate a protectable interest when the terms of the covenant appear reasonable under the second prong of the legal test).
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ity, but the excess of it, much of which is facially inconsistent. 51
The abundance of law and lack of clarity have affected the practices of employees and employers, who are often ill-informed
about the ramifications of these agreements. 52 Departing employees often mistakenly believe that these clauses are never enforceable, while employers are at times dismayed to find their
carefully crafted agreements rejected as unreasonable. Thus,
from a pragmatic perspective, the current law falls short of establishing the framework necessary to negotiate fairly between the
needs of the employer and employee in the context of any particular employee defection. 53
From a theoretical perspective, this confusion and lack of consistency reflect a fundamental problem with the premise on
which the current test is based-the idea that employers' legitimate business interests are tangible and discrete and can be distinguished from the employee. The following section considers
courts' use of protectable interests as a proxy for determining
when a noncompete agreement is appropriate from a policy perspective. Within that model, the subcategory of "confidential input most eloquently by the Ohio court in Arthur Murray:
This is not one of those questions on which the legal researcher cannot find
enough to quench his thirst. To the contrary there is so much authority it
drowns him. It is a sea-vast and vacillating, overlapping and bewildering.
One can fish out of it any kind of strange support for anything, if he lives so
long.
Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland v. Witter , 105 N.E.2d 685, 687; see also
Sterk , supra note 31, at 404 (noting that use of a reasonablene ss standard rather
than a bright line rule encourages inefficient litigation of enforceability issues);
Whitmore, supra note 5, at 485 (noting that the ambiguity surrounding enforceability has resulted in vast amounts of litigation and reported decisions). If this was the
status of the law forty-five years ago when the Arthur Murray court ruled, one can
only imagine how much more unnavigable the waters are today.
52 See Kurt H. Decker, Refining Pennsylvania's Standard for Invalidating a NonCompetition Restrictive Covenant When an Employee's Termination ls Unrelated to
the Employer's Protectible Business Interest, 104 DICK. L. R E V. 619,621 (2000) (noting that employers are often mistaken about the proper uses of restrictive covenants); Whitmore, supra note 5, at 485 (noting that abundance of precedent makes it
difficult for lawyers to predict how courts will treat a given noncompete ); Gallo,
supra note 3, at 733 (noting that because there is no way to predict whether a covenant will be enforced , it is difficult for an employer to confidently write such an
agreement even where its interests are strong); cf Sterk, supra note 31, at 438 (noting the uncertainty generated by distinctions between enforceable and unenforceable noncompetes in sale of business context).
53 This uncertainty has significant economic implications. See Callahan, supra
note 28, at 705 (noting that uncertain validity of noncompetes causes employers to
rely less upon such agreements, resulting in lower wages for employees having access to confidential information, and creates incentives for employees to breach).
51 As
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formation" has grown increasingly important as a basis for
protection. In theory, employee access to such business information suggests that the employer's intent in requesting enforcement of a covenant is to prevent the improper disclosure of
information that it owns, as distinct from asserting any claim to
the employee or to the employee's own knowledge or experience. As will be seen, the concept of confidential business information escapes meaningful definition, and in many situations,
particularly those involving employer-provided training, it is insufficiently severable from the employee to be capable of performing the policing function that the law expects of it.
A.

The Confidential Information Free-For-All

Suits alleging interests in business-planning, customer-related
or other "confidential" information are perhaps the most common amongst modern noncompete cases. This is not surprising
given that modern companies frequently are unable to point to
specific trade secrets of the traditional secret recipe variety associated with manufacturing industries. 54 Under the existing doctrinal scheme, information-producing
or service-oriented
companies seeking to assert a protectable interest must rely on
some type of financial or business-related data, what might be
thought of as a "soft" trade secret. Notwithstanding the prevalence and arguable importance of the confidential information
category, however, an examination of recent case law suggests
that courts have embraced no clear rule regarding what information can be legally classified as confidential and have taken very
different approaches to determining whether an employee's access to information justifies enforcement of a noncompete.
Courts almost invariably treat the question of whether there is
a protectable interest in confidential information as a matter of
state common law. This makes sense given that state statutes re54 On the movement from a manufacturing to a service-oriented economy, see
generally STEPHENA. HERZENBERGET AL., NEw RuLEs FOR A NEw EcoNoMY:
EMPLOYMENTAND OPPORTUNITYIN POSTINDUSTRIALAMERICA 1-3 (1998) and
Anthony Carnevale & Donna Desrochers, Training in the Dilbert Economy, 53
TRAINING& DEv. 32 (1999). Even companies that continue to provide tangible
products often find that the underlying technologies are being developed and disseminated so quickly that they lose their competitive value and trade secret status
almost immediately. See David G. Majdali, Note, Trade Secrets Versus the Internet:
Can Trade Secret Protection Survive in the Internet Age?, 22 WHITTIER L. REV. 125,
141-43 (2000) (surveying cases holding that information made accessible over the
internet loses its protected status).
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garding noncompetes generally do not specify what constitutes a
legitimate interest, let alone provide particular guidance as to
what falls within the "confidential information" category. 55 Surprisingly, though, courts have given little attention to the more
detailed statutory framework offered by the law of trade secrets,
the sister interest with which confidential information is inevitably paired. Trade secret law sets out rigorous criteria for invoking court protection under which a plaintiff must prove the
existence of qualifying information that derives independent economic value from not being publicly known, plus the presence or
likelihood of misappropriation of the secret. 56 Despite the fact
that courts generally treat the protectable interest in confidential
information as coextensive with employers ' interest in trade
secrets, 57 few courts do more than recite the uniform definition
of a trade secret in assessing the presence of a protectable interest and none appear to make a genuine effort to apply its
language .58
55 Onl y ten states have stat ut es spe cifically addressing noncompetes. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE § 8-1-1 (1993) (Alabama); CAL Bus. & PROF. CooE §§ 16600-16602.5
(West 1997) (Californi a); Cow . R Ev. STAT. § 8-2-113 (2001) (Colorado); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 542.335 (West 1997) (Florida); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:921(A)(2)
(West Supp. 2002) (Louisi ana); MrcH . CoMP. LAws ANN. § 445.774a (West 1989)
(Michigan); N.D. CENT. CoD E § 9-08-06 (1987) (North Dakota); S.D. ComFIED
LAws § 53-9-11 (Michi e 1990) (South Dakota); TEx. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN.
§§ 15.50-.52 (Vernon Supp. 2002) (Texas); Wrs. STAT. ANN. § 103.465 (West Supp.
2001) (Wisconsin). Only four of the ten state statutes enum erate the employer 's
protectable interests. See Cow . R Ev. STAT.§ 8-2-113 (Colora do); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 542.335 (Florida); LA. R Ev. STAT. ANN. § 23:921(A)(2) (Loui siana) ; S.D . CODIFIED LAws § 53-9-11 (South D ako ta). Onl y the Louisian a stat ut e purports to define
"co nfidential " information , but it do es so broadly and only in the limited context of
appro priation of a comput er program. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:921(A)(2).
56 The Uniform Trad e Secrets Act defines trade secret as "in forma tion, including
a formula, pattern, compil ation, program, device, method , technique, or process,
that derives independent eco nomic value" from not being kn own an d which is subject to reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § 1(4)
(amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990); see also Economic Espion age Act of 1996
§ lOl(a) , 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (Supp. IV 1998) (definin g "tra de secre t" to include
"financial , business, scien tific, technical, economic , or engineering infor mation " that
has independent economic value and which the owner tak es reaso nab le meas ures to
keep secre t).
5? See Bus . Intellig ence Servs. , Inc . v. Hudson , 580 F. Supp . 1068, 1072 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (looking to trad e secret definition to determine enforceability of noncompete
prohibiting disclosur e of co nfidenti al information).
58 This is a problem not only in noncompete cases , but in the law of trade secrets
generally, which is due at least in part to the ambiguity inherent in creating a workable definition of the ter m. See Alan Hyde, Employment Law After the Death of
Employment, l U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 99, 114 (1998) (noting courts' refusal to
define trade secrets and do ubtin g whether a meaningful definition could be set
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This absence of legal guidance has resulted in a free-for-all as
to what confidential information actually is and whether it is sufficiently present in any instance to justify enforcement of a
noncompete. In some cases, courts have read the category generously with seeming deference to the employer's own characterization of the information as confidential. For instance, in
Comprehensive Technologies International, Inc. v. Software Artisans, Inc. ,59 a case involving both noncompete and trade secret
claims, an employee responsible for developing data processing
software left midproject to establish his own company with several former employees. He soon developed a competing data
processing program. 60 On CTI's subsequent trade secret claim,
the court analyzed the employer's computer programs and their
components and concluded that no trade secret interest had been
demonstrated. 61 It found that CTI had failed to show that the
database organization, its access techniques, or its identifiers
were not publicly available. 62 It further concluded that the arrangement and interaction of these functions within the employer's programs were common to all computer programs of the
same type and therefore established no protectable trade secret
interest even when considered as a composite. 63
Having dismissed the trade secret claim, however, the court
went on to conclude that the employer had demonstrated a legitimate interest in confidential information justifying enforcement
of the employee's noncompete. 64 Without any explanation of the
applicable legal standard, the court cursorily concluded that "[ a ]s
the individual primarily responsible for the design, development,
marketing and sale of CTI's software, [the employee] became intimately familiar with every aspect of CTI's operation, and necessarily acquired information that he could use to compete with
forth); Gilson, supra note 3, at 599 (suggesting courts' reluctance to more carefully
define "trade secret" is attributable to imprecision in the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act).
59 3 F.3d 730, 732-34 (4th Cir. 1993).
60 Id. at 734.
61 Id. at 737.
62 Id.
63 Id. In addition, the court noted that even if CTI had established a trade secret,
there was insufficient evidence of misappropriation. See id. (dismissing as mere circumstantial evidence the fact that the competitor program was developed quickly
and without documentation).
64 Id. at 739.
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CTI in the marketplace." 65 The only additional explanation or
source proffered in the opinion to support this generalized conclusion was the fact that the employment agreement containing
the noncompete recited that the employee would have access to
confidential and secret information. 66
Such rote conclusions are typical of many cases involving the
assertion of confidential information as a protectable interest.
Having seemingly rejected the use of precise trade secret standards, courts have established no substitute system of rules for
evaluating the information alleged to be protectable, and, consequently, decisions finding a sufficient employer interest often appear to lack analytic rigor. The availability of careful legal
analysis is also limited in part by the information itself and the
fact that the employer's motivation for the use of the covenant is
in theory the avoidance of disclosure. 67 Even under trade secret
law, where the proof requirements are more exacting, courts
have recognized that an employer need not enumerate all of its
secrets to obtain protection, as doing so would compromise the
very information it wished to protect. 68 Thus, those cases that
discuss the confidential information that the employee possesses
often do so only in general terms, without identifying what in
particular justifies the restraint.
While such cases suggest to some extent that employers have
considerable leeway in using noncompetes, others exhibit a more
rigorous approach. In Earth web, Inc. v. Schlack ,69 for instance,
the court carefully parsed the responsibilities of the defendantemployee and the information alleged to be confidential and
concluded that the company had no protectable interest justifying the enforcement of a noncompete. The case involved
Id.
Jd. This is consistent with the general idea that because noncompetes are the
product of mutual consent embodied in the form of a written contract, injunctions to
support their enforcement are less onerous, or at least less surprising, to the employee. Another way to explain the result is that the court used the noncompete to
sidestep the difficult trade secret analysis; by enforcing the noncompete the court
could give the employer the relief it sought without declaring the subject matter a
true trade secret. See Stone, supra note 3, at 585 (analyzing CTI decision) .
67 See Gilson, supra note 3, at 602; Edmund W; Kitch, The Law and Economics of
Rights in Valuable Information , 9 J. LEGAL STUD.683, 691 (1980) (suggesting that
purpose of using a noncompete is to avoid process of airing secret in open court).
68 See Vermont Microsystems, Inc. v. Autodesk, Inc., 88 F.3d 143, 150 (finding
contention that company should have provided list of trade secrets "unpersuasive
inasmuch as such a practice could have jeopardized VMI's security").
69 71 F. Supp. 2d 299 (S.D .N .Y. 1999).
65
66
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Earthweb's operation of a family of Web sites offering products
and services to information technology (IT) professionals. 70 The
defendant, Schlack, was a vice president with editorial responsibility for all content appearing on Earthweb's Web sites.71 After
working for one year, Schlack was hired away by a provider of
print-based IT information to develop a competitor Web site. 72
On Earthweb's motion for injunctive relief, the court initially
found that the type of employment which Schlack had accepted
did not fall within the precise definition of competition precluded
by his employment agreement, and that the agreement consequently could not bar him from assuming his new position. 73
Notwithstanding this determination, the court devoted the bulk
of its opinion to analyzing whether the noncompete would be enforceable if the parties had contracted to cover Schlack's new
job. 74 In so doing, the court surveyed each source of information
that could conceivably be deemed confidential to which Schlack
had been exposed. 75 It considered Schlack's knowledge of
Earthweb's business plan, contracts with licensees, and marketing strategy, as well as Schlack's exposure to technical information.76 In each area, the court concluded that Schlack's
knowledge was tangential or conceptual in nature, and therefore
did not include Earthweb's proprietary information, or that the
information in question was publicly available or insufficiently
sophisticated in some other respect to rise to the level of confidential information. 77 Thus, the court concluded that Earthweb
had failed to establish a protectable interest justifying a restraint,
and that the noncompete agreement could not have been enforced even if Schlack's competitive behavior had fallen within
its parameters. 78
While the depth of analysis exhibited in Earthweb may be
atypical, its existence demonstrates how the absence of a consis70Id.

at 302.
Id. at 303.
72 Id. at 303, 306.
7 3 The relevant difference between the two companies' products was that
Earthweb derived its contents through licensing agreements with third parties
whereas the competitor Web site contained information prepared by a staff of inhouse journalists. Id. at 306.
74Id. at 312-17.
75Id. at 313-16.
76Id. at 314-16.
77 Id.
78Id. at 316.
71
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tent approach to what constitutes confidential information can be
a double-edged sword for employers seeking to enforce noncompetes. The seeming willingness of many courts to sanction areasonably drafted restrictive covenant without close examination of
the alleged confidential information supporting it has encouraged an expansive lay understanding of what justifies the use
of such an agreement. 79 In practice, noncompete agreements are
requested with alarming frequency in employment relationships
where the presence of confidential information is difficult to imagine under even the most liberal understanding of the term. 80
Earthweb suggests that these agreements might ultimately be
held unenforceable. Yet while the case could offer a dose of reality to some employers, it is unlikely to undermine the in terrorum
effect that the existence of such agreements has on employees,
and the collective effect of the large number of cases employing a
less rigorous analysis may be profound. 81
79 See Lumex, Inc. v. Highsmith, 919 F. Supp. 624, 630 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (praising
defendant's explanation of confidential information as "anything not known outside
Cybex" as a good lay definition of the legal term).
so See Stone, supra note 3, at 586 (noting that courts no longer require the presence of a trade secret and have allowed employers to enforce covenants against a
variety of employees including manicurists, carpet installers, and liquor deliverymen). Other surprising examples of employees asked to sign such agreements, allegedly to protect their employer's proprietary information, include bartenders, see
Daiquiri's III on Bourbon, Ltd. v. Wandfluh, 608 So. 2d 222 (La. Ct. App. 1992),
cosmetologists, see Carl Coiffure, Inc. v. Mourlot, 410 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. Civ. App.
1967), pest exterminators, see Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Etheridge, 582 So. 2d
1102 (Ala. 1991), garbage collectors, see Brewer v. Tracy, 253 N.W.2d 319 (Neb.
1977), janitors, see Royal Servs., Inc. v. Williams, 334 So. 2d 154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1976), night-watchmen, see Stein Steel & Supply Co. v. Tucker, 136 S.E.2d 355 (Ga.
1964), and undertakers, see Folsom Funeral Serv. v. Rodgers, 372 N.E.2d 532 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1978). Similar concerns have been raised concerning the prevalence of
training repayment agreements. See Anthony W. Kraus, Repayment Agreements for
Employee Training Costs, 1993 LAB. L.J. 49, 49 (noting that repayment agreements
have been used to protect employers' interests not only in sophisticated professions
and high-tech industries, but also in connection with low-tech industrial craft training). For discussion of the use of noncompetes to protect employer investments in
training, see Part II.B, infra.
SI See Earth web, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 310 (noting that a noncompete "can be a powerful weapon in the hands of an employer [as) the risk of litigation alone may have a
chilling effect on the employee"); Michael J. Hutter, Drafting Enforceable Employee
Non-Competition Agreements to Protect Confidential BL1SinessInformation: A Lawyer's Approach to the Case Law, 45 ALB. L. REV. 311,320 (1981) (noting that employees subject to noncompete agreements are reluctant to depart knowing their
employment opportunities may be greatly curtailed); Sterk, supra note 31, at 410
(observing that "by limiting the number of attractive alternatives available to an
employee, a restrictive covenant may ... 'coerce' that employee to remain with his
initial employer"): Sullivan, supra note 5. at 622-23 (discussing the chilling effect of
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That is not to suggest that Earthweb offers a better approach,
or that employer overreaching is the only concern. What may be
most striking about Earthweb is the fact that Schlack was not an
entry-level or semiskilled employee, but a corporate officer involved to some degree in all aspects of his employer's business.
That some portion of the knowledge Schlack acquired at
Earthweb could legitimately be deemed proprietary would
hardly seem to stretch the concept of a protectable interest.
Leaving aside the difficulties it presents in application, if confidential information as a category has any purpose within the
common law analysis it must be that it captures and legitimates
an employer interest in something less than a trade secret. 82 Although trade secret law has expanded to protect some forms of
business-planning and customer-related information, 83 it historically protected only particular processes or formulae. 84 Confidential information may therefore be viewed as a more flexible
basis for invoking noncompete protection which embraces less
noncompetes on employees); cf Victoria A. Cundiff, Maximum Security: How to
Prevent Departing Employees from Putting Your Trade Secrets to Work for Your
Competitors, 8 CoMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 301, 309 (1992) (suggesting employers' use
of confidentiality agreements keeps employees from leaving and guides their future
actions).
82 See Gilson, supra note 3, at 605 (suggesting that noncompetes may provide an
added measure of protection in situations where intellectual property law does not
clearly embrace employers' asserted property interests) (quoting J. Charles
Mokriski, Trade Secrets: Protect Your Competitive Edge-Or Perish, MAss. LAW.
WKLY.,May 30, 1994, at 33); Hutter, supra note 81, at 324-25 (noting that customer
lists, or other confidential business information that employee had access to, which
does not rise to the level of a trade secret may still be protected under noncompete
law). However, some scholars have critiqued this view arguing that noncompete
protection should be limited to those instances in which a true trade secret is at
stake. See Paul H. Rubin & Peter Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not to
Compete, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 98 (1981); Phillip J Closius & Henry M. Schaffer,
Involuntary Nonservitude: The Current Judicial Enforcement of Employee Covenants Not to Compete-A Proposal for Reform, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 531,541 (1984).
83 See Lumex, Inc. v. Highsmith, 919 F. Supp. 624,630 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding
that trade secrets include information dealing with new equipment, manufacturing
costs, processes such as pricing structures, sales training, projected product release
dates and life spans, and profit margins); Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262,
1270 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding the existence of a trade secret in Pepsico's methods of
pricing, distributing, and marketing its sports drink).
84 See, e.g., Imperial Chem. Indus. v. Nat'! Distillers & Chem. Corp., 342 F.2d 737,
742 (2d Cir. 1965) (noting that trade secrets exist "in a combination of characteristics
and components, each of which, by itself, is in the public domain, but the unified
process, design and operation of which, in unique combination, affords a competitive advantage"); see also Kitch, supra note 67, at 690 (suggesting that trade secret
law's coverage overwhelmingly deals with "process technology-how
to make
something").
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tangible information and composite knowledge gained from employment. To the extent the Earthweb court was looking for a
smoking gun in the form of a customer list, marketing plan, or
specific piece of software, it may have missed the forest for the
trees.
Cases like Earthweb and CTI exhibit both a difference in analytic approach and a tension within the law. In holding the employer to the line, Earthweb was acting consistently with the
underlying assumption that employee access to tangible, discrete
proprietary information is a requirement of proof that, if present,
will ensure the employer is not impermissibly attempting to restrain the individual employee. Yet cases like CTI implicitly recognize that n.ot all proprietary information can be easily captured
or defined, and suggest that an employer may have a justifiable
interest in an employee's composite or abstract knowledge
gained on the job. While such an interest makes intuitive sense,
particularly in light of the type of work many service employees
perform in an information-driven economy, it seriously jeopardizes the long-standing distinction between information and individual that the law of noncompete enforceability has historically
embraced as a means of keeping the underlying policy concerns
in balance.
B.

The Trouble with Training

This problem of delineating the boundaries of confidential information leads inevitably to larger questions about the relationship between noncompete law and the ownership of human
capital. The difficulty presented by the competing approaches
described above can be cast as a problem of the inseparability of
knowledge from the people who possess it. Implicit in the current legal approach to enforceability is the assumption that the
value of protectable information must lie outside any individual's
interpretation or implementation of the knowledge in question.
This is to ensure that the employer's goal is to contain the information itself rather than those employees who use it. In trade
secret law, the concept of such a distinction between worker and
work product is imbedded in the requirement that information
have "independent" economic value to be legally protectable. 85
85 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990)
(defining trade secret as one that "derives independent economic value, actual or
potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by
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Thus, an employer pursuing a trade secret claim may be called on
to show that the knowledge in question can be applied in contexts other than the employer's business in order to obtain an
injunction. 86
Such independent value would in most cases be present where
the dispute involved a traditional trade secret, like a secret
formula or process, that could be used competitively by any
other business that happened to obtain it. Moving up the ladder
of abstraction, however, value increasingly derives not from information as raw data but from its application in particular contexts.87 A company's ability to effectively utilize confidential
business or customer-related information rests largely on the
competency and skills of its employees, who in turn often obtain
their expertise from the experience and training provided to
them on the job. In such cases it is human capital, or knowledge
imbedded in people, that comprises the employer's interest
rather than data or information in the traditional sense. 88
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure
or use").
86See Applied Indus. Materials Corp. v. Brantjes, 891 F. Supp. 432, 438 (N.D. Ill.
1994) (rejecting employer's trade secret claim because "the information [employee]
obtained during his employment with [employer], which ended in 1990, [was] so
outdated that it lack[ed] current economic value"); George S. May Int'l v. Int']
Profit Assocs., 628 N.E.2d 647, 653-54 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (rejecting trade secret
claim because employer failed to prove that its manuals, software, and financial information had "economic value to both its owner and its competitors"); cf. Religious Tech. Ctr., Church of Scientology Int'l v. Scott, 869 F.2d 1306, 1310 (9th Cir.
1989) (holding that scientologists' church scriptures appropriated by competitor
church did not constitute trade secrets because the church did not prove the scriptures gave them an economic advantage over competitors).
87 See Kitch, supra note 67, at 711-12 (noting that detailed knowledge of one application could prove valueless to employee who defects to competitor that uses
entirely different systems). Indeed, Kitch suggests one way companies can protect
valuable information is to compartmentalize the production process so individual
employees' knowledge of their employer's procedures is limited to familiarity with
their specific job or unit. Id. at 712.
88 This type of information has been called "tacit" knowledge, referring to the
skill and experience required for effectively creating and implementing an idea as
opposed to the resulting innovation. See Gilson, supra note 3, at 577 n.10. Value
deriving from tacit knowledge and human capital has been increasingly emphasized
in the business management literature of the last decade and is particularly important to high-tech and other new economy companies whose "products" are knowledge-based. See PATRICKH. SULLIVAN,VALUE-DRIVENINTELLECJ'UAL
CAPITAL
13-16 (2000) (describing origin and development of concept of intellectual capital in
business management field from 1980s to present); KARL ERIK SvEIBY,THE NEw
ORGANIZATIONAL
WEALTH3-8 (1997) (demonstrating high proportion of intangible
corporate assets to market value for major global companies including high-tech
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For this reason cases involving employer-provided training and
on-the-job experience present a significant challenge to the assumptions underlying noncompete law and the rules governing
enforceability. To the extent that the value of information is
wrapped up in the quality of its implementation, employer-provided training and exposure are necessary components to creating the competitive advantage that the employer will ultimately
wish to protect. They also have concrete value to the employer
in that they are generally provided at some cost. 89 At the same
time, however, training and on-the-job exposure create value for
the individual employee in terms of the resulting increase in his
or her own skills, knowledge, and marketability. Since these
qualities are indistinct from the employee, fundamental principles of noncompete law dictate that an employer cannot have a
protectable interest based on the provision of training or an employee's experience because it is akin to recognizing an employer
interest in restraining the individual.
Traditionally, courts have managed this tension by applying
the confidential information concept in cases where an employer's interest rests in whole or in part on training. While the
provision of generalized training alone cannot form the basis of
an enforceable noncompete, a protectable interest may be
demonstrated where the training is "extraordinary" or so highly
specialized that it itself constitutes a form of confidential information that would otherwise be protected. 90 The distinction is in
theory based on the type of information transmitted to the employee in the training process. In Kelsey-Hayes Co. v. Maleki ,91
for instance, the employee was a neophyte electrical engineer
who had been hired by a research and development facility to
translate mathematical algorithms into a standard computer language. The employee had been hired straight out of college, apparently without any relevant prior experience, and was placed
businesses); Gilson, supra note 3, at 594-95 (noting that the intellectual property of
high-tech firms is usually informal in character and embedded in human capital).
89 This is frequently the case even if no formalized training is provided because
the employer may pay the employee more than his or her worth during the period in
which the employee is learning the job. See infra Part III.8.1.
90 See Thermo-Guard, Inc. v. Cochran, 596 A.2d 188, 194 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991);
Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623,627 (Utah 1982); Voorhees v. Guyan Mach. Co., 446
S.E.2d 672, 677 (W. Va. 1994). Two state statutes specifically list specialized training
as a protectable interest. See CoLo. REv. STAT.§ 8-2-113 (2001) (Colorado); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 542.335 (West 1997) (Florida).
91 765 F. Supp. 402,403 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
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under the tutelage of one or more senior employees in order to
gain the requisite programming skills. 92 He ultimately left to become a programmer at another research and development facility.93 On the employer's subsequent action, the court rejected
the argument that the employer's provision of training justified
enforcement of the employee's noncompete agreement. 94 The
court emphasized that the employee had merely learned to use a
nonproprietary computer language that was used by companies
nationwide. 95 The employee was never taught the significance of
the algorithms he translated, which were generated by the company's scientists. 96 Drawing a distinction between "skills" and
"secrets," the court concluded that knowledge of the computer
language was a general skill in which the employer could have no
legitimate competitive interest. 97
Thus, the Kelsey-Hayes court treated training as a subset of the
interest in trade secrets and confidential information. Absent a
showing that the employer-provided training transmitted proprietary information, the covenant failed to meet the protectable
interest threshold and was deemed unenforceable. 98 It is significant that within such an analysis, the cost to the employer of providing the training has little bearing on whether the employer's
interest is protectable. Since the proper inquiry is whether confidential information has been transmitted, it has been held that
even where the employer expends funds to support formalized
Id.
Id. at 404.
94 Id. at 407.
95 Id. at 405-06.
96 Id. at 406.
97 Id. at 407-08; see also Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. Mileham, 620
N.E.2d 479, 486 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (finding no protectable interest in employer
training employee to authenticate rare coins by a general process used in the industry); Brunner v. Hand Indus., 603 N.E.2d 157, 160 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (finding no
interest in employer's provision of training in polishing orthopedic equipment using
a nonunique process); Tom James Co. v. Mendrop, 819 S.W.2d 251, 253 (Tex. App.
1991) (finding that measuring methods and tools used in custom tailored men's
clothing business were general in nature and not specific enough to justify
protection).
98 Kelsey-Hayes Co., 765 F. Supp. at 407; see also Hapney v. Cent. Garage, Inc.,
579 So. 2d 127, 132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that employee's training was
not protected but could have been if employer's knowledge and methods constituted
trade secrets or other confidential information); Thermo-Guard, Inc. v. Cochran,
596 A.2d 188, 193-94 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (finding no protectable interest because
"no such specialized training or sales and marketing techniques were in fact conveyed to [employees] during their employment at Thermo-Guard").
92
93
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training, such expenditures are insufficient to support a noncompete if the employee gains only generalized knowledge or experience.99 However, in deciding the case in favor of the employee
in Kelsey-Hayes, the court made a point of noting that the cost of
providing computer language training to the defendant-employee
was negligible. The employer had provided no formalized instruction, and the employee gained most of his knowledge either
on the job or by consulting publicly available instruction books
that were provided to him. 100
Indeed, despite the distinction between general skills training
and proprietary information, there appears to be growing judicial
sensitivity to employer claims based on costly investments in
training and development of employees, regardless of the character of the training provided. 101 This is particularly striking in
cases involving less skilled employees who would be unlikely to
access business secrets in the training process. In Borg-Warner
Protective Services Corp. v. Guardsmark, Inc., 102 for instance, the
employees worked as security guards for Guardsmark, a company that provided private security services to various clients, including the Gap retail stores. The employer utilized an extensive
screening process in recruiting and hiring guards, which involved
the assessment of a twenty-eight-page application and numerous
background checks. 103 Once hired, each employee received general safety training and underwent an eighty-hour on-the-job
training process in which the employee received instruction from
99 See Landpoint Surveys, Inc. v. Stockwell, No. CA99-1022, 2000 WL 1586348, at
*3-4 (Ark. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2000) (holding that sending employee to a two-day
seminar in Houston to learn how to be a GPS technician was not evidence of extraordinary or specialized training); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Foti, 302 So. 2d 593,
598 (La. 1974) (finding that expense of furnishing the employee with training at
Orkin's Manager Training School was not enough to validate covenant where employee learned only general managerial skills); Diesel Driving Acad., Inc. v. Ferrier,
563 So. 2d 898, 905 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that "even if the claimed expenses
were substantial in amount, most of the expenses were for the type of training that
consistently has been found legally insufficient to support enforcement of an agreement not to compete").
100 Kelsey-Hayes Co., 765 F. Supp. at 406-07.
101 See, e.g., Brunswick Floors, Inc. v. Guest, 506 S.E.2d 670, 673 (Ga. Ct. App.
1998) (noting that '"[i)n determining the legitimacy of the interest the employer
seeks to protect, the court will take into account the employe[r)'s time and monetary
investment in the employee's skill and development of his craft"') (quoting Beckman v. Cox Broad. Corp., 296 S.E.2d 566, 568-69 (Ga. 1982)); see generally Kraus,
supra note 80, at 51 (noting this trend).
102 946 F. Supp. 495, 496 (E.D. Ky. 1996).
103 Jd. at 496.
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a supervisor at the facility where he or she would be assigned to
work. 104
When a second security company, Borg-Warner, obtained the
Gap contract, it attempted to hire the guards that Guardmarks
had trained and stationed at the Gap store. 105 In Guardsmark's
subsequent suit to enforce the guards' noncompete agreements,
the court recognized that the security guards were employed in
low-level positions that did not involve the use of extraordinary
skills or the provision of unique services. 106 Notwithstanding , the
court found in favor of Guardsmark based on a "more modern
approach," emphasizing the costliness of the employer's investment in hiring and training. 107 Drawing on cases involving the
appropriation of customer contact information and business
goodwill, the court noted that Guardsmark's training familiarized
the employees with the particular security requirements of the
client's site and afforded the guards the opportunity to learn the
client's culture. 108 The court did not suggest that this information
was proprietary. 109 Rather, the court appeared persuaded by the
fact that the employer had devoted significant time and money to
recruiting and training its employees, creating a windfall for the
new security company, which would be spared a comparable layout.110 It concluded that Guardsmark was particularly vulnerable to having its experienced employees "'opportunistically
appropriated'" by competitors or clients, and that the employer
had a legitimate interest in protecting itself contractually from
the loss of that '"work product. "' 111
Such analysis largely defies the distinction between general
skills training and the acquisition of specialized information required for a legitimate interest in training under the traditional
104 Id. at 496-97. Guardsmark did not charge the Gap for the first two weeks of a
new guard's placement at its facility during which time this training was provided.
Id.at 497.

Id.
Id. at 501-02.
107 Id. at 501.
108 Id. at 502.
109 It seems implausible to assert that the guards ' knowledge of the Gap facility
10s
106

could constitute confidential information even under the broad approach previously
discussed . See supra Part II.A .
110 See Borg-Warner Protective Servs. Corp. , 946 F. Supp . at 502 (noting that the
two week on-the-job training and the employees' familiarity with the culture of the
client's firm made Guardsmark "vulnerable to disinterm ediation").
111 Id. at 502 (quoting Consultants & Designers, Inc. v. Butler Serv. Group. 720
F.2d 1553, 1558 (11th Cir. 1983)).
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doctrine. By enforcing the security guards' noncompetes, the
court recognized that even generalized training may be protectable where it is costly to the employer and hence valuable to the
competition. More importantly, in equating the trained security
guards with the employer's work product, the court implicitly
abandoned the assumption that an employer's interests must be
distinct from its employees in order to be protected. In so doing,
the court recognized that in some circumstances the employees
themselves are assets of the company.
The potential implications of such an approach can be seen in
Balasco v. Gulf Auto Holding, Inc., a case involving a nonpiracy
clause. In Balasco, a former sales manager of the Courtesy car
dealership hired away several sales personnel to work at a competitor dealership in contravention of the manager's employment
contract. 112 It was the employer's practice to hire personnel with
little or no sales experience and "invest[ ] considerable money
and time to teach them the Courtesy way of selling cars" utilizing
both in-house and outside trainers. 113 There was no allegation
that the training consisted of proprietary information, nor any
articulated claim that the personnel in question had acquired any
client goodwill from their experience or training. Notwithstanding, the court concluded that the parties' "agreement was necessary to protect the substantial investment Courtesy makes in
specialized training for its sales staff," and further that the agreement protected the "legitimate business interests of promoting
productivity and maintaining a competent and specialized sales
team." 114 Thus, the court recognized not only the employer's interest in protecting its investment in nonproprietary training, but
seemingly went further to suggest that the employer had an interest simply in retaining an effective staff.
Although the enforcement of a nonpiracy clause is less damaging to the employee than the enforcement of a noncompete
agreement, 115 the apparent expansion of the legitimate interest
112 Balasco v. Gulf Auto Holding, Inc., 707 So. 2d 858, 860 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1998).
113 Id. According to the employer, it took up to six months to develop their raw
recruits into effective sales personnel. Id.
114 /d.
115 Such a clause does not prevent the employee from earning a living, only from
soliciting other employees of clients to join his or her competitive pursuit. See, e.g.,
Merrill Lynch. Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ran, 67 F. Supp. 2d 764, 774 (1999)
(holding that "(employee's] agreement not to solicit (employer's] clients was not an
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concept in Balasco is one that could be drawn in any case involving a noncompete under similar facts.116 The employer in
Balasco apparently had no identifiable interest in information,
but, in the words of the court, had demonstrated a legitimate interest in the quality of its personnel. In this way, cases that relax
the confidential information requirement to permit an interest in
costly, but not proprietary, training pave the way for greater judicial recognition of employees as protectable corporate assets,
fundamentally undercutting the distinction between worker and
work product on which the current law rests.
Indeed, the rigid division between permissible and impermissible interests may well be collapsing. While the difference between information that is and is not confidential may be difficult
to draw, the training cases suggest that the distinction between
people and information is even more elusive. Cases like BorgWarner and Balasco bring this confusion to a head because they
do not involve "information" in the obvious sense of the word,
but rather the transmission of skills, experience, and composite
knowledge, the value of which is inextricably bound up with the
employees themselves. Yet the complexity of such cases rests on
more than mere linedrawing. It would be possible to dismiss
these decisions as outliers, contrary to existing doctrine and overstepping the bounds of policy in recognizing novel employer interests, but for the fact that their results seem somehow fair. The
significance of Borg-Warner and Balasco may well be that, despite the public policy rhetoric, there are instances in which employers legitimately have an interest in retaining qualified
workers, and enforcing a noncompete to protect such interests
does not violate fundamental principles of worker protection. If
that is the case, then the doctrine's implicit reliance on the
worker/work product distinction not only creates difficulties in
illegal agreement not to compete, as it in no way precluded him from pursuing his
vocation, but rather was a reasonable and enforceable anti-piracy provision").
11 6 Courts generally find that non-solicitation,
non-disclosure, and antipiracy
clauses are governed by the same law as noncompete agreements. See, e.g. , Sevier
Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Willis Corroon Corp. of Birmingham, 711 So. 2d 995, 998 (Ala.
1998) (holding that state statute limiting contracts in restraint of trade applied to
employment agreements irrespective of whether they were classified as covenants
not to compete or as nonsolicitation agreements); Flickenger v. R.J. Fitzgerald &
Co., 732 So. 2d 33, 34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (using the same general law of
restrictive covenants to enforce agreement precluding disclosure of confidential information, solicitation of employer's clients and employees, and competition with
employer for three years after employment).
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application, but also misconceives the purpose of the protectable
interest requirement. If an employer-asserted interest in the
value of a particular worker can be justified in instances where
that value is the result of employer investment, then the absence
of discrete secret information is not an effective proxy for determining when the use of a noncompete offends public policy. To
the extent the protectable interest approach continues to envision an easy division between people and their work products,
the current legal test will necessarily be both over- and underinclusive in identifying appropriate uses of these agreements.

III
ENGINEERING
REVISED

WORKPLACE

RELATIONSHIPS:

DESCRIPTION

OF EMPLOYER

INTERESTS

AND

PROTECTION

THE

A

WORKER

PROBLEM

The previous section demonstrates that the protectable interest concept is functionally unworkable and, in many cases, fails to
describe accurately the interests of contemporary employers. As
a result, employers seeking enforcement must pigeonhole their
actual interests into one of the preexisting categories, most often
the confidential information category, resulting in various contortions of the doctrine and eroding the predictive value of existing case law. More importantly, because the doctrine is rooted
in policy opposing efforts to restrain individual workers, its fairness inquiry is misdirected. The focus on the presence or absence
of a protectable interest precludes investigation into whether efforts to retain workers may in fact be legitimate and whether, by
contrast, such efforts might indicate employer overreaching.
The following section seeks to understand this distinction between proper and improper restraints on workers in the context
of the modern employment relationship. Crucial to such an analysis is a consideration of the way employers operate in an economy that has changed significantly in the last several decades.
Thus, the section begins with a brief overview of the changing
work environment. It then recharacterizes the interest underlying employers' use of noncompetes as an interest in people
rather than in discrete information. In light of the current workplace dynamic, employers are inclined to use noncompetes as a
means both of protecting investments in training and policing
employee loyalty and commitment. While that behavior may be
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acceptable in some instances, it is also subject to abuse. The section suggests that noncompete agreements give employers the
best of the old employment regime and the new workplace in the
form of a legal midway point between term employment and employment at will. It is the employer's discretion to use noncompetes to enforce its own conception of the parties' social contract
of employment that poses challenges for noncompete doctrine
and workplace policy.
A.

The New Workplace in the New Economy

An analysis of the forces motivating employers' increased reliance on noncompete agreements starts with an examination of
the new workplace and how it departs from prior models of the
employer-employee relationship. 117 The modern employment
relationship has undergone a profound change in the last twenty
years. The secure, long-term employment relationships associated with an earlier era are largely obsolete today, having been
replaced with a variety of short-term employment arrangements:
Companies are increasingly outsourcing work and relying on
contingent, part-time and other flexible work models. 118 From
the perspective of employees, job tenure is in decline and job
hopping is commonplace. 119
These aspects of the modern workplace, while not revolutionary, 120 represent a significant break from the model of employ117The concept of a "new workplace" and recent changes in the implicit understanding between workers and employers have received attention from a variety of
academic disciplines , including law, see , e.g ., Stone, supra note 3, at 522; Hyde ,
supra note 58, at 101-02 (1998) , sociology, see , e.g., RICHARD SENNETT, THE CoRRos1ON OF CHARACfER: THE PERSONAL CONSEQUENCES OF WORK IN THE NEW
CAPITALISM(1998), and business management, see, e.g., PETER CAPPELLI,THE NEW
DEAL AT WORK: MANAGING THE MARKET DRIVEN WORKFORCE 17 (1999);
HERZENBERG ET AL, supra note 54, at 12-14. Thus, this section draws on literature
from multiple fields in describing these developments.
118 See Stone, supra note 3, at 539-41 (reviewing statistics on growth of temporary
agencies and use of part-time employees and independent contractors). Professor
Stone refers to this segment of the workforce as the "precariously " employed , a
category which encompasses all workers who are employed without " any implicit or
explicit promise of job security." Id. at 542.
I 19 An increasing number of employees in the middle of their careers have already made several job switches . Daniel M. Gold, Switching to New Jobs, Endangering Savings , N.Y . T1MES, Jan . 17, 1999, at sec. 3, p. 10.
120Research suggests that the long-term employment system that is currently being overthrown is a recent and largely aberrational phenomenon that followed on
the heels of a low job security regime similar to that which is developing today. See
CAPPELLI, supra, note 117, at 51-57 (describing "putting-out " labor system of nine-
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ment that was in place for much of the last century. During the
decades preceding the boom in the services industries, employment relationships reflected a particular style of labor management that evolved in manufacturing industries. Typical of this
approach were sharply differentiated job descriptions embracing
distinct skills, close supervision and internal training of employees by middle management, and hierarchical but well-defined
ladders for promotion and advancement. 121 Although positions
within such structures tended to be low skill, employers successfully combated the problem of turnover and low morale by making tacit promises of long-term job security, by providing
progressive wage increases, and by offering an array of benefits
and services. 122Thus, the model of implicit lifetime employment
within a single company became the norm.
In recent years, however, employment practices have dramatically altered in response to a variety of economic changes. Since
the mid-twentieth century, the economy has moved from one primarily dependent on traditional industries and the manufacturing of hard goods to one in which information management and
other service-sector jobs predominate. 123 The routinization and
structure associated with manufacturing cannot easily be imposed on the work performed by employees within these industries.124 More importantly,
technological
advances
in
communication and the resulting globalization of the economy
teenth century as characterized by flat organizational structure, significant autonomy among low-level workers, and extensive reliance on independent contractors
and other forms of outsourcing).
121See id. at 59-64 (describing characteristics of labor management systems initiated by Alfred Taylor, Henry Ford, and Frederick Taylor during mid-twentieth century); SENNE"IT,supra note 117, at 39-45 (describing Fordism and the routinization
of work): Stone, supra note 3. at 529-32 (describing "scientific management" approach to labor management).
122See Stone, supra note 3. at 532.
123Service sector jobs grew by thirty-six million between 1959 and 1999, such jobs
comprising approximately forty-one percent of American jobs and providing approximately fifty percent of total United States earnings in 1999. See Carnevale &
Desrochers, supra note 54, at 32-33. The percentage of the workforce in services
industries surpassed that in goods and manufacturing in the early 1950s. See
HERZENBERGET AL., supra note 54, at 2-3.
124See SENNETr, supra note 117, at 51 (describing modern approach of "flexible
specialization," which seeks to deliver more varied products more quickly to the
market, as "the antithesis of the system of production embodied in Fordism"); Carnevale & Desrochers, supra note 54, at 33 (noting that unlike manufacturing, in
which success was measured by the achievement of high volume at low cost. success
in the new economy demands more complex skills. and. consequently. more complex performance standards).
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have led to increased competition and the need for greater flexibility within companies. 125 Employers must be capable of altering business strategies and production capabilities with minimal
lead time in order to meet fluctuating market demands and are
therefore unable to promise employees long-term employment
along defined career paths. 126 Instead, employers are hiring
skilled employees who can meet their immediate goals and are
then replacing or redirecting those workers when their needs
change. 127 Thus, employees today can anticipate frequent lateral
moves both between and within companies and departments
over the course of their careers. 128
These changes in the economy and the workplace have altered
the expectations of employees and employers about the nature of
their relationship, what is often referred to as the "social" or
12s See CAPPELLI,supra note 117, at 4-5 (attributing recent changes in work practices to , among other things , increasingly competitive product markets and pressures
to create market niches) ; SENNETr, supra note 117, at 52 (positing that "[t)he most
strongly flavored ingredient in th[e] new productive process is the willingness to let
the shifting demands of the outside world determine the inside structure of institutions"); Stone, supra note 3, at 549 (noting significance of increased trade and global
competition and pressures to achieve short-term cost reduction in explaining contemporary labor manag e me nt trends).
126 See CAPPELLI,supra note 117, at 5 (noting that such competition reduces market lead time, making long-term investments impractical for companies); Stewart J.
Schwab, Predicting the Future of Employment Law: Reflecting or Refracting Market
Forces?, 76 IND. L.J. 29, 31 (2001) (predicting firms will be increasingly reluctant to
hire specialized workers under implicit long-term contracts due to risk that skills will
become superfluous in changing global market).
127 See CAPPELLI, supra note 117, at 49 (1999) . This trend is reflected in the contemporary practice of downsizing despite profitability and favorable conditions.
Whereas downsizing was historically a response of last resort to declines in business
and economic downturns , a growing number of contemporary layoff initiatives are
attributed to restructuring and outsourcing efforts designed to enhance productivity.
See id. at 116-17 (summ a rizing findings in AM. MGMT. A ss ' N, 1994 AMA SURVEY
ON DOWNSIZING: SUMMARYOF KEY FINDING (1994)) ; FREDERICK F. REICHHELD,
THE LOYALTY EFFECT: THE HIDDEN FORCE BEHIND GROWTH, PROFITS, AND
LASTINGVALUE 94-95 (1996).
128 Professor Stone refers to this employment trajectory as the "boundaryless career. " Stone , supra note 3, at 553-54. A quintessential example is the employment
pattern that predominated amon g high-tech employees in California 's Silicon Valley
during the late 1990s. See Hyd e , supra note 3. However , the phenomenon exists in
a ll sectors of the economy . A 1995 study of leading companies found that managerial positions had a life time e xpectancy of three to four years , meaning that such jobs
were designed with the expectation that the employee would leave within that time
frame . See CAPPELLI,supra note 117, at 115 (summarizing findings in CORPORATE
LEADERSHIP COUNCIL, PERFECl"ING LABOR MARKETS: R EDEFININGTHE SOCIAL
CONTRACTAT THE WORLD'S HIGH-PERFORMANCECORPORATIONS(1995)).
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"psychological" contract of employment. 129 Previously employers and employees implicitly understood at the outset of their
relationship that the employee's career development within the
company would proceed along a predesignated path: The employee who performed adequately and demonstrated loyalty and
commitment to the company would be rewarded with a lifetime
job with steady pay and periodic advancement through an existing hierarchy_l3° Thus, the employee could safely invest in acquiring firm-specific skills and rely on the company to manage
his or her career development. Now, the market has in effect
replaced the employer's own rules and policies for controlling its
labor force. Since employers cannot predict how changes in the
market will alter their labor needs, they are essentially encouraging employees to benchmark their professional development
against the demands of the industry as a whole rather than in
relation to the internal hierarchy of the company itself. 131 The
new understanding between employers and employees is that,
129 Such an understanding is not a contract in the legal sense, but rather refers to
the underlying, often unspoken, expectations of the parties. See CAPPELLI, supra
note 117, at 21 (distinguishing psychological contracts from legal contracts as agreements arising from individual perceptions of appropriate behavior not tied to any
formal written document); Stone, supra note 3, at 549-50 (characterizing psychological contract as the belief in the existence of a reciprocal exchange creating mutual
obligations); Thomas A. Kochan, Reconstructing America's Social Contract in Employment: The Role of Policy, Institutions, and Practices, 75 CH1.-KENT L. REv. 137,
137 (1999). For an explanation of how such contracts develop and their effect on
workplace behavior from an organizational psychology perspective, see Denise M.
Rosseau, Psychological and Implied Contracts in Organizations, 2 EMPLOYEERESP.
& RTs. J. 121, 123-29 (1989).
13D See CAPPELLI, supra note 117 at 21 ("The psychological contract that accompanied the lifetime corporate employment model represented an exchange of job
security and predictable advancement for loyalty and good performance.").
Significantly, employers frequently acknowledge such implicit understandings and conform
their behavior to comply with their terms even in the absence of a legal obligation to
do so. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforceability of Norms
and the Employment Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1913, 1917 (1996) (noting
how corporate norms, such as limiting discharge to for-cause situations and retaining
older workers despite declining performance, coexist with inconsistent doctrinal rule
of employment at will).
131 See John Case, The Question We All Wonder About:
"For Whom Do You
Work?", BosTON GLOBE, Dec. 29, 1993, at 44 ("[I]n today's new economy, we work
for ourselves simply because we can no longer count on the benevolence of the
organizations that issue those paychecks."). This phenomenon has been described
as the substitution of external market solutions for the internal labor markets governed by employer-generated rules and policies. See CAPPELLI, supra note 117, at
viii; Schwab, supra note 126, at 31-32; see generally Rock & Wachter, supra note
130, at 1915 n.6 (defining the internal labor market as the network of arrangements,
understandings, and agreements that constitute the employment relationship within
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rather than grooming employees for internal promotion, employers will offer employees work experience that will keep them
marketable to other employers in the event that they are terminated.132 Thus, the employer's promise of long-term employment has been replaced by a promise of employability, and the
new understanding is that the employee's lifelong relationship
will be with the market rather than the company.
B.

Noncompetes and the Employer's "People" Interest

This landscape poses obvious challenges for employees who
must monitor their career development against changing demands and the chronic risk of losing their jobs. However, it also
poses significant difficulties for the employer who must ensure
access to a pool of qualified workers while having little ability to
forecast its needs. Because the common law system of employment at-will places no limitations on the parties' ability to terminate their relationship, employers risk losing competent
employees to their competitors. Thus, in a tight labor market,
where highly skilled employees are scarce, companies may view
noncompetes as a means of protecting one of their most important assets: their workers. This subsection offers a justification
for that use in economic and sociological terms. As explained
below, employers' use of noncompetes can be characterized as a
means of securing the employer's investment in employee development, or as enforcing a new "social" contract of employment
that envisions an exchange of training and experience for spot
commitments to particular projects and goals.
1. Protecting Investments in Human Capital
Since much of the value of high-tech and service-oriented companies lies in the thoughts, skills, and creativity of their employees, the success of these companies depends on their ability to
firms as distinguished from the external employment market in which firms seek to
fill vacancies and workers search for jobs).
132See Stone, supra note 3, at 569 (describing Rosabeth Moss Kanter's recommended model for offering workers "employability security" in place of employment security) (citing RosABETH Moss KANTER, ROSABETHMoss KANTER ON THE
FRONTIERSOF MANAGEMENT190-94 (1997)); Hal Lancaster, A New Social Contract
to Benefit Employer and Employee, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 1994, at Bl (suggesting
employees should look to their current employers to provide satisfying work. learning opportunities, and career management skills rather than long-term security along
defined career paths).
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harness and develop human capital. 133 Yet competition for talent
makes it difficult for employers to attract and retain qualified
workers. Since the message employers are sending their employees encourages self-reliance and disclaims long-term employment,134 employees have little incentive to remain in any one
employment relationship. Modem employers are therefore at
risk of losing significant assets through voluntary attrition. 135
This phenomenon poses a paradox to employers seeking to
maximize their intellectual assets. While financial contributions
to employees' professional development can augment a company's value, in practice employers may not reap the benefit of
such investments due to employee defection. 136 In theory, the
use of fixed-term employment contracts could resolve the problem of voluntary attrition, but such agreements pose difficulties
of enforcement and undermine employers' efforts to achieve
flexibility in the face of changing market demands.137 Thus, despite the strategic importance of cultivating internal talent, employers may not make such investments for fear that their efforts
133 See Gilson, supra note 3, at 585 (noting importance of information embedded
in human capital in describing "knowledge spillover" effect that occurs when employees defect to new companies); supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
134 See infra Part II.A.
l35 The dollar cost of employee turnover, though difficult to measure, can be extremely high. See REICHHELD,supra note 127, at 96-98 (citing anecdotal evidence
from the trucking, auto service and investment brokerage industries). One business
management expert estimates that in the investment brokerage industry, the total
outlay involved in bringing a new broker to profitability exceeds $100,000 and that
for each new recruit that reaches the profitability point, two others will defect before
yielding any return for the employer. Id. at 103-05.
136 This reality perpetuates a "vicious cycle" in which the failure to train creates
shortages of skilled employees, which in turn leads employers to step up efforts to
hire experienced workers from the ranks of their competitors, which in turn reduces
companies' incentive to train workers internally. See CAPPELLI,supra note 117, at
6.
137 As a general rule, fixed-term contracts are not specifically enforceable against
employees. RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OF CONTRACTS§ 367 (1981) ("A promise to
render personal service will not be specifically enforced."); see also Sterk, supra
note 31, at 387-88 (describing the basis for this rule as rooted in the Thirteenth
Amendment's protection against involuntary servitude as well as practical concerns
about courts' ability to supervise forced job performance). Such agreements therefore hamstring the employer to a set term during which it must retain the employee
without providing any guarantee that it will retain the benefit of the employee's
services during that period. For this reason, law and economics scholars have suggested that noncompetes offer an efficient alternative to fixed-term contracts. See
Posner & Triantis, supra note 3; cf Lester. supra note 3, at 53 (suggesting noncompetes may "fill a gap where other legal and extra-legal mechanisms fall short").
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will merely aid the competition. 138
To combat this cycle, employers may turn to noncompetes as a
vehicle for protecting financial investments in their workers. 139
Economics-influenced literature has historically supported the
use of noncompetes for such purposes, recognizing that the provision of general1 40 training creates human capital that the employee may be inclined to sell to competitors for a profit. 141 Such
incentives occur where the employer overpays the employee at
the outset of the relationship, anticipating that it will recoup its
loss by paying the employee less than his or her true worth for a
period after training is provided. 142 During this "pay back" pe138 The incidence of employee poaching and mass defections legitimate this concern. See, e.g., Hyde, supra note 3 (discussing widely publicized trade secret lawsuit
brought by Intel against four employees who defected to competitor Broadcom);
Rebecca Buckman, Tech Defectors from Microsoft Resettle Together, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 16, 2000, at Bl (describing Microsoft "brain drain" resulting from teams of
software developers defecting en masse to form "spin-off' competitor companies);
see also CAPPELLI,supra note 117, at 182-85 (describing poaching as a standard way
for companies to meet their skills needs and discussing headline examples from high
profile companies).
139 This, of course, is but one of many methods available to companies seeking to
enhance employee retention. An increasingly common approach to the problem,
one which relies on the carrot rather than the stick, is the adoption of equity-based
compensation plans. See generally MARGARET BLAIR, WEALTH CREATION AND
WEALTH SHARING: A COLLOQUIUMON CORPORATE GOVERNANCEAND INVESTMENTSIN HUMAN CAPITAL (1996). But see CAPPELLI, supra note 117, at 185-87
(suggesting that "golden handcuff' compensation packages drive up labor cost without effectively thwarting poaching efforts). In some instances, companies have negotiated agreements with specific competitors under which each agrees to refrain
from recruiting employees from the other. See, e.g., Rebecca Buckman, New Web
Software Start-up Draws Microsoft Workers-and Its Ire, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11,
2000, at Bl (reporting existence of anti-poaching agreement between Microsoft and
local competitor Crossgain).
140 Law and economics literature distinguishes between general and specific training, Specific training is unique to the particular employer who provides it, while
general training may be useful to the current employer as well as to subsequent
employers in the industry. See Kitch, supra note 67, at 683,684 (summarizing GARY
S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICALAND EMPIRICALANALYSIS(2d ed.
1975)). In theory, specific training need not be protected by a noncompete because it
does not create any value in the employee that another firm would seek to buy, but
an employee with general training is likely to be in demand by other employers who
wish to reap the benefit of the initial employer's investment. See id.
141 See, e.g., Callahan, supra note 28, at 717-18; Kitch, supra note 67, at 684-86;
Schulman, supra note 3, at 115.
142 Although in theory the employer would withhold the cost of training from
wages, that is not always possible. Sometimes the training is sufficiently expensive
that the worker cannot finance it through wages, as where the training involves the
transmission of a trade secret. See Rubin & Shedd, supra note 82, at 96-97. Alternatively, the labor market may be such that employees have the bargaining power to
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riod, the employee is more valuable to companies that have not
invested in the employee's acquisition of skills, and he or she is
liable to defect to competitors willing to pay the salary that a
fully trained employee can command. 143 The noncompete protects the employer from the loss that would arise in that scenario.
This is true regardless of whether the training involves trade
secrets or other proprietary information as required under existing law. It is the cost to the employer, and the value of that
training to other employers in the market, that justifies the
restraint. 144
Although this analysis appears most applicable to a junior employee receiving formalized training at the outset of employment,
it can also apply to the informal acquisition of new knowledge by
more experienced employees. Formalized entry-level training is
in decline among employers, 145 in part due to the disincentives
described above and because changing demands make it difficult
for employers to anticipate the skills employees will need in the
future. 146 Therefore, the employee in the new workplace is likely
to be learning through exposure more than through instruction.
Even so, the employer may be overpaying the employee during
the progression of his learning curve. As employees are thrust
into new projects and new work teams, they gain skills and knowhow that increase their value both to their employers and the
market. While the common law has historically viewed this type
insist on higher wages. See CAPPELLI,supra note 117, at 44 (noting that pressure to
raise wages makes training difficult to fund).
143 See Lester, supra note 3, at 62-63; Callahan, supra note 28, at 716-17; Kitch ,
supra note 67, at 685; Rubin & Shedd, supra note 82, at 97.
144 That is not to say that the enforcement of a noncompete based on the employer's provision of training is necessarily efficient. See Lester, supra note 3, at 7274 (suggesting that although noncompetes can be used to encourage optimal investments, practical barriers in formation and enforcement significantly undermine their
value); Rubin & Shedd, supra note 82, at 109-10 (recognizing economic rationale for
use of noncompetes to protect investments in training, but concluding that the likelihood of employer overreaching militates against expansion of the categories of legitimate employer interests). The limitations of the economic argument in support of
enforcing noncompetes to protect investments in training are discussed more fully in
Part III.C.2 , infra.
145 See CAPPELLI
, supra note 117, at 152-53 (reporting that per employee training
expenditures dropped between 1983 and 1991 and that overall length of training has
declined even where its incidence remains unchanged). This observation is particularly true of Silicon Valley where a significant amount of what was formally in-house
training has been outsourced to educational institutions and other external providers. See id. at 176-77.
146 See id. at 44, 198.

1206

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80, 2001]

of experiential knowledge as belonging solely to the employee,
companies may have an ownership interest in it, at least to the
extent of their financial investment in its acquisition. Thus, employers may use noncompetes as a way of recouping the cost of
funded training, formal or otherwise, by ensuring that employees
stay long enough for the employer to break even. 147
2.

Policing Loyalty and Organizational Commitment

Another aspect of the new employment relationship that may
influence employers' use of noncompetes to protect their interest
in their employees is the disintegration of traditional notions of
company loyalty. While employers as entities are profit minded,
employers consist of individual managers and decision makers
who have personal interests at stake in their interactions with
employees. These interests may include the intangible benefits
of working with particular people and the desire to continue positive workplace relationships. 148 Although such interests are not
entirely divorced from pecuniary concerns, 149 they might usefully
147 It should be noted that despite the value of noncompetes to individual employers using the agreement in this manner, recent scholarship suggests that, in some
instances, employers may be better served by the information "spillover" that occurs
in economies that tolerate frequent movement between companies than they are
trying to protect individu al investments in workers. See Gilson, supra note 3, at 60709 (comparing economic development in Silicon Valley to that in Boston's high-tech
corridor and concluding that California law prohibiting enforcement of noncompete
agreements contributed to Silicon Valley's increased success); Hyde , supra note 3
(attributing Silicon Valley's success to absence of noncompetes , infrequency of trade
secret litigation, and work culture that tolerates rapid movement between jobs). Assuming this is the case, however , in the absence of an all-out adoption of California's
legal regime, employers will always find it in their individual interest to request
noncompetes from their own workers. See Gilson, supra note 3, at 609 (noting collective action problem posed by regime in which each employer tries to restrict mobility of its workers while taking advantage of spillover from other firms). The
scholarship in this area has yet to advocate for the adoption of California's legal
regime in other jurisdictions. See id. at 627-29 (noting that adoption of rules prohibiting noncompetes must be preceded by serious study of trade-offs between enhancing knowledge spillovers and reducing incentives for initial innovation which may
result if employer property rights are diluted) .
148 See Macneil , Values in Contract , supra note 11, at 348-49 (discussing values of
reciprocity and solidarity in relational contracts); Gude! , supra note 11, at 776-77
(same). Such interests often are not considered in the economic analysis previously
presented. See Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of
Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J . LEGAL STUD. 271, 278 n.13
(1992).
149 See REICHHELD,supra note 127, at 19-21 (advocating loyalty-based management approach focusing on retention of customers, employees and investors as key
to long-term value creation); Stacey Wagner, Retention: Finders, Keepers, TRAINING
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be conceived of as the employer's interest in employee loyalty. 150
While expectations of loyalty were a pivotal component of the
lifelong employment regime, their significance is less clear in an
environment where rapid movement between jobs is both anticipated and necessary. Some modern employers are explicitly disclaiming expectations of loyalty in articulating a new approach to
their relationship with workers. 151 Such statements serve to diffuse employees' lingering expectations of long-term employment,
which the employer may ultimately be unable to meet. However,
they also undercut employers' goal of retaining valued employees, as well as their efforts to motivate the type of above-average
performance that will increase firm productivity. 152
Significantly, loyalty is not a concept with a distinct legal definition in the employment context. Employers owe no freestanding duty of loyalty to their employees beyond compliance with
their contractual obligations and are obviously free to terminate
workers at will absent an explicit contrary arrangement. While
employees owe a duty of loyalty to their employers under tort
law, that duty is limited to refraining from direct competition
with the employer or otherwise acting in derogation of the employer's interests, so long as the employment relationship continues. 153 This duty has never been interpreted to regulate the
& DEv., Aug. 1, 2000, at 64 (noting that positive working relationships and personal
investments between employers and employees are known to improve productivity
and profit margins).
150 As articulated by organizational psychologists, loyalty comprises a variety of
behaviors indicative of commitment, including emotional identification with the
company, willingness to make personal sacrifices to advance the companies' goals or
products, and intention to remain employed despite external opportunities. See
Caroline Louis Cole. Building Loyalty, WORKFORCE,Aug. 2000, at 42 (summarizing
findings of a study on worker attitudes conducted by Aon Consulting Worldwide's
Loyalty Institute); Charles W. Mueller & Jean E. Wallace, Employee Commitment,
WORK & OccuPATIONs, Aug. 1992, at 211.
151 CAPPELLI,supra note 117, at 25-28 (excerpting employment policy statements
of major companies including Apple Computer, AT&T, and General Electric).
152 Because employee creativity and teamwork are crucial to companies' success,
employers wish to encourage innovative behavior that goes beyond bare job requirements. See id. at 46 (describing employer need for "extra-role" behavior by employees in new work systems which involve less employee supervision and greater
reliance on employee initiative); REICHHELD,supra note 127, at 92 (characterizing
desirable employees as those whose talent and self-motivation result in increased
personal productivity and consequent surpluses for employer and customers); Stone,
supra note 3, at 556-57 (describing employer interest in effecting "organizational
citizenship behavior" and entrepreneurial activity).
l53 See. e.g., Planmatics, Inc. v. Showers, 137 F. Supp. 2d 616, 626 (D. Md. 2001)
('"(A]n employee may not solicit for himself business which his position requires
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nature of the employee's departure from the company or to
touch competitive conduct posttermination. Because the employer and employee may terminate their relationship at any
time, and any greater commitments between them must be defined by contract, loyalty has no legal significance in policing either the agreed upon terms of the relationship or the
circumstances of its termination. 154
As a business management and human resources matter, however, loyalty is a measurable, 155albeit intangible, component of
the employment relationship that can create value for the organization.156 Companies have eschewed the rhetoric of loyalty in
crafting their new deal with workers largely because it evokes the
exchange of job security for good performance associated with
him to obtain for his employer. He must refrain from actively and directly competing with his employer for customers and employees, and must continue to exert his
best efforts on behalf of his employer."') (quoting Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner,
382 A.2d 564,568 (Md. 1978)); Western Elec. Co. v. Brenner, 360 N.E.2d 1091, 1094
(N.Y. 1977) (An employee is '"prohibited from acting in any manner inconsistent
with his agency or trust and is at all times bound to exercise the utmost good faith
and loyalty in the performance of his duties."') (quoting Lamdin v. Broadway Surface Adver. Corp., 133 N.E.2d 66, 67 (N.Y. 1936)); Lamorte Bums & Co. v. Walters,
770 A.2d 1158, 1169 (N.J. 2001) ("The duty of loyalty prohibits the employee from
taking affirmative steps to injure the employer's business.").
154As in other contractual relationships, however, courts imply a duty of good
faith in fulfilling the terms of the agreement. See, e.g., Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul
Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163, 167 (N.Y. 1933) ("[I]n every contract there is an implied covenant that neither party shall do anything which will have the effect of
destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract."). That principle may be interpreted, in certain circumstances, to prohibit unjust termination, as where the purpose of the termination is to avoid contractual
obligations. See, e.g., Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co., 778 P.2d 744 (Idaho 1989)
(finding violation of covenant of good faith and fair dealing where employer terminated employee for hardship resulting from her extended absence despite fact that
absences did not exceed the leave time permitted under company sick day policy);
Fortune v. Nat'! Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977) (finding jury question on wrongful termination claim where company terminated employee salesman
between initiation and consummation of new sales account, thereby depriving him
of commission otherwise entitled to under terms of written contract).
155There are various studies that purport to measure levels of loyalty and commitment within an organization through survey questions. See, e.g., Cole, supra
note 150, at 42; Mueller & Wallace, supra note 150, at 211.
156Studies suggest that committed employees demonstrate higher performance
and lower rates of tardiness and absenteeism, as well as a greater likelihood to place
company interests above self-interests. See CAPPELLI,supra note 117, at 46. Loyal
employee behavior can in tum lead to more effective selection and retention of customers, in addition to increasing general efficiency and reducing training costs. See
REICHHELD,supra note 127, at 100-02 (positing seven distinct economic benefits
associated with employee loyalty).
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the old employment regime. 157 But employers are unable to disclaim their desire for some level of employee commitment on
different terms. Companies need employees who will be innovative, hard-working, and loyal to their projects and their coworkers.158 Such a conception of loyalty contemplates commitment to
a particular product, work team, or project as opposed to longterm commitment to the company itself .159
The problem for employers, however, is how to encourage
dedication and above-average performance while simultaneously
telling employees they have no guarantee of continued employment and may be terminated for any reason. 160 That conundrum
reflects the inherent limitation of an at-will system in which the
employee has no incentive to go beyond specified job requirements, or even to see a job through, but where the success of the
relationship from the employer's perspective depends on the employee's cooperation with evolving expectations and commitment to advancing the company's interests over time. In effect,
the extracontractual understanding of the old regime, the tacit
exchange of loyalty for security, resolved this conflict from both
ends. 161 In the absence of such an agreement, however, the system is at odds with itself.
For this reason, employers may turn to noncompetes as a
means of policing a new form of organizational commitment. Instead of seeking company loyalty in the traditional sense, employers are now asking employees to make spot commitments to
particular work teams and projects. In return, the employees receive marketable experience. 162 It is in effect an exchange of ereSee supra Part III.A.
See Stone, supra note 3, at 557 (discussing positive correlation between "affective commitment," described as the employee's identification with company goals
and desire for company success, with high-quality job performance).
159 Two Cheers for Loyalty, EcoNOMIST,
Jan. 6, 1996, at 49; Tom Payne, Company
Loyalty: May it Rest in Peace, MANAGE, July 1, I 995, at 30 (suggesting that corporate loyalty is not "dead," but rather has been redefined to fit the needs of the new
workplace).
160See CAPPELLI, supra note 117, at 13 (noting internal contradiction of the new
workplace in which employers are seemingly demanding more from employees but
offering less in return).
161 See Stone, supra note 3, at 529-32 (discussing how scientific management used
promotion hierarchies and cause-only dismissal policies to combat problems of low
morale and high turnover).
162See discussion supra Part III.A. The desire for spot commitments is consistent
with the way work is organized in the new workplace. usually around projects with
specific time lines. During the two-year development of a new product, it may be
crucial to keep the design team together, but less important to keep them together
157
158
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dentials for commitment. On the one hand, this may suggest that
the enforcement of noncompetes to protect employers' "people"
interest violates the new social contract: If employers promise
workers employability in exchange for loyalty to their work, the
employees have in effect "purchased" their experience and
should not be prevented from using the skills they acquire elsewhere.163 On the other hand, noncompetes may be seen as a way
of holding the employee to the terms of the tacit agreement
where the employee would otherwise be inclined to breach. If,
for instance, the understanding is that the employer will provide
training necessary for an employee to contribute to a particular
project in exchange for the employee's commitment to its completion, it might be appropriate to allow the employer to enforce
a noncompete to prevent the employee from departing midproject, though inappropriate to restrain the employee once the
project has concluded. 164 While the old loyalty-for-job security
compact was self-enforcing, the new one is jeopardized by the
lure of external opportunities and the pace of change in a market
where skills and experience are in high demand. 165 That difficulty is compounded by the message that employees should
gauge their own development by external standards and that ultifor the next version, which may bear no relationship to the prior one. See CAPPELLI,
supra note 117, at 176.
163 Professor Katherine Stone convincingly asserts this argument in her recent
scholarship. See Stone , supra note 3, at 590-91. Under such an analysis , the employee purchases experience through the work he or she provides rather than
through reduced wages. Such a perspective dispels the economic justification for
enforcement based on employer investment in training and development. See id. at
591 ("When an employer has promised to give an employee skill development and
general knowledge as part of the employment deal , then it cannot be said that the
employer has paid for its acquisition. ").
164 Many case outcomes are consistent with this observation, inclining toward enforcement of noncompetes where the timing of the employee's departure creates
special hardships for the employer. See, e.g., Comprehensive Techs. Int'I, Inc. v.
Software Artisans, Inc ., 3 F.3d 730, 737-41 (4th Cir. 1993) (enforcing noncompete
against employees who departed during production of computer program to create
competitor program for subsequent employer); cf Hyde , supra note 3 (discussing
"moralistic" quality of court analysis of trade secret claims in California).
165See Kraus , supra note 80, at 49 (suggesting that modern employers have been
forced to implement training repayment contracts since they cannot rely on employee loyalty and job satisfaction to protect their investments) ; cf CAPPELLI
, supra
note 117, at 15 (noting need for strong labor law to create incentives not to "cheat "
in transactional relationships). Research on the relationship between formal contracts and informal social contracts suggests that parties will rely on informal understandings where the terms of such agreements are self-enforcing, but will opt for
formalized contracts where there is a danger of opportunistic behavior. See Rock &
Wachter, supra note 130, 1944.
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mately the employee is likely to pursue his or her career elsewhere.
In this environment,
employers may look to
noncompetes to enforce the new social contract and a new understanding of loyalty and commitment.
C.

Revisiting Worker Protection: The Absence of Bargainedfor Commitment and the Limitations of
Preenforcement Review

The previous section explained why employers might, in contravention of the existing rule, attempt to use noncompetes for
the express purpose of retaining their workers. 166 Such an analysis rejects the existing proxy for assessing fairness: If employers
are in some manner purchasing or contracting for the right to
keep an individual employed, the absence of a trade secret or
other discrete information does not indicate the employer is
overreaching. However, this analysis does not suggest that all
uses of noncompetes to prevent employee attrition should be
deemed legally permissible or that these agreements should be
enforced according to their terms. Indeed, there is often reason
to doubt the legitimacy of the written document and its particular
terms as a reflection of a bargained-for exchange. 167 This uncertainty stems from the indeterminate nature of the parties' rela166 It would be interesting to attempt empirical research to determine to what
extent employers are using noncompetes for these purposes as opposed to traditional reasons, like trade secret protection. I know of no study that has attempted
this. In fact, it may prove exceedingly difficult to execute such research due to its
inevitable reliance on some form of self-reporting. My own anecdotal queries to
human resources professionals as to why their companies use noncompetes have
tended to elicit responses that echo the doctrinal rule. That is, employees are apt to
say they use noncompetes to protect trade secrets and "confidential information"
but are generally unable to elaborate meaningfully as to what exactly requires protection. It may be that these individuals, based on their professional experience and
their interactions with attorneys, have learned the legal touchstone for enforceability
and invoke it by rote. Or it may be that given the confusion surrounding the law,
human resources understand this phraseology as embracing their interests in intellectual capital and employee loyalty. Either way, it suggests that a scientific effort to
document the reasons for the use of noncompetes would be a challenging task.
16 7 It should be noted that even within the economics-influenced literature relatively few commentators advocate a pure free market analysis of noncompete enforcement, recognizing that despite the viability of the employer investment model,
various factors may lead the parties to create suboptimal contracts. See Gallo, supra
note 3, at 723-24 (describing the "moderate" economic view of noncompete contracts under which judicial intervention may be justified where enforcement will
yield inefficient results); see generally supra note 144. But see Callahan, supra note
28, at 725-27 (advocating for enforcement of noncompetes subject only to standard
contract defenses).

1212

OREGON

LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 80, 2001]

tionship as of the time of formation and the likelihood that they
will modify their implicit understanding as the relationship
evolves. On the other hand, it is unlikely that judicial assessment
of the fairness of the agreement at the time of enforcement provides a workable means of balancing the parties' interests, and it
may compound the problem by diminishing the binding effect of
written agreements and reducing the parties' incentive to contract responsibly. The following section explores those concerns.

1. Noncompetes from a Relational Contracts Perspective
Despite the viability of employers' interest in their workers
from a business perspective, the explanation that employers are
purchasing a right to their employees may ultimately be found
deficient when measured against the practical consequences of
enforcement in some instances. Case law not infrequently
reveals employer efforts to enforce agreements worded broadly
enough to jeopardize the employee's ability to engage in his or
her profession. 168 A fundamental principle involving the sale of
labor has always been a disdain for contracts that approximate a
form of indentured servitude. 169 Restraint of competitive employment is not itself objectionable, and is sanctioned as an alternative to specific performance in situations where the breach of a
contract for personal services cannot be remedied through
money damages. 170 The problem, however, is that the duration
and scope of the restraint in many noncompete agreements appear disproportionate to the breach in the context in which it
occurs.
168 See, e.g., Nature House, Inc. v. Sloan, 515 F. Supp. 398, 399-400 (N.D. Ill.
1981) (noncompete prohibiting indefinitely employee artist from rendering any future drawings of birds for any entities); Gynecologic Oncology, P.C. v. Weiser, 443
S.E.2d 526, 528 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (a physician non-compete containing two-year
restraint plus tolling provision permitting duration to be extended indefinitely during any period of violation); Karpinski v. Ingrasci, 268 N.E.2d 751 (N.Y. 1971)
(noncompete placing lifelong restriction on defendant dentist's ability to practice
oral surgery within a five county radius); Frederick v. Profl Bldg. Maint. Indus., 344
N.E.2d 299, 301 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) (noncompete placing ten-year restriction on
management trainee's competition in the contract cleaning business). In such situations the terms of the agreement, if applied as written, would not only constrain an
employee's choice of work but seriously preclude his or her ability to earn a living.
l69 See Sterk, supra note 31, at 387-88 (discussing Thirteenth Amendment rationale for preventing employer from obtaining specific performance of a personal service contract); see also discussion supra Part I.A.
170 The seminal case is Lumley v. Wagner, 42 Eng. Rep. 687, 693 (Ch. 1852) (restraining defendant opera singer from singing at any concerts other than plaintiff's
where defendant breached an exclusive three-month performance contract).
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In framing the noncompete problem from the perspective of
employee protection then, the question becomes why the terms
of written agreements often prove onerous to employees if we
deem individual workers competent to enter into agreements to
sell their labor and human capital. The historical response, previously discussed, is that employees lack bargaining power to negotiate fair terms of employment and that the agreement reached
will therefore unduly favor the employer. 171 Law and economics
scholars, as well as others who champion an expansive view of
employer interests, have long disdained this rationale for judicial
intervention. 172 From such perspectives, concerns about employee bargaining power appear overly simplistic against the current economic backdrop in which human capital is recognized as
a valuable asset. 173 If the employer wishes to retain a particular
worker, then by definition the employee must possess valuable
skills and knowledge that give the employee some degree of leverage.174 Such an argument does not maintain that employees
have equivalent bargaining power as a rule, but rather that the
relative bargaining strength of the parties will depend on the labor market and demand for the employee's skills, such that generalizations about employees as a class are of limited utility in
justifying a pervasive policy of judicial intervention. 175
171See supra

Part I.A.
e.g., Sterk, supra note 31, at 409 (arguing that "inequality of bargaining
power ... can provide, at best, only a partial explanation for legislative and judicial
reluctance to enforce restrictive covenants"); Callahan, supra note 28, at 721 (noting
that "[m]ost contracts are negotiated by parties with unequal bargaining power, and
unequal shrewdness, yet courts do not invalidate or rewrite ordinary contracts on
these grounds").
173Courts' ability to issue such injunctions may be considered a logical corollary
to individuals' rights to alienate their services, which, if limited, may result in undesirable limitations on individuals' ability to enter into contracts of their choosing.
See Sterk, supra note 31, at 411 ("By protecting an employee's freedom to leave his
employer without serious consequences, courts impose a corresponding restriction
on an employee's freedom to contract about future use of his 'own' human
capital.").
174Arguably those employees asked to sign noncompetes are likely to be upperlevel employees who have greater ability to negotiate with their employers. See
Callahan, supra note 28, at 721-22 (reasoning that most sensitive information is in
the possession of more highly skilled, sophisticated employees who have alternative
employment opportunities). But see Stone, supra note 3, at 586 (noting increased
prevalence of noncompetes within lower-level and lower-skilled professions such as
beauticians and delivery persons).
175See CAPPELLI,supra note 117, at 34-35 (discussing effect of shifts in skilled
labor supply on employee bargaining power and, by consequence, the implicit agreements reached between employers and employees). The dearth of high-tech em172 See,
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Even if a particular employee possesses valuable human capital that is in demand in the relevant market, however, there are
reasons to distrust the quality of the bargain he or she reaches
with the employer. Some of these reasons are procedural: Many
noncompetes are presented to employees on the day they start
their jobs or shortly thereafter, at which point the employee is
effectively unable to assert the leverage he or she otherwise
could by declining the job. 176 More importantly, even an employee who is given the opportunity to review a noncompete
before accepting a position is likely to have little incentive to negotiate its terms. In general, employees have limited information
on which to base a decision about the fairness of a noncompete
or evaluate the risk of accepting its terms. 177 The employee cannot predict such things as the extent and value of training that
the employer will provide, the progression of his or her wages,
the personal satisfaction he or she will experience on the job, the
duration of the parties' relationship, or the future direction of the
company and the market, all of which will reveal the wisdom of
signing the agreement. 178 Although the employer likewise has
limited information from which to determine whether and what
type of noncompete it should demand from its employees, it is
certainly in a better position to make that prediction given that it
controls the structures through which the employment relationployees relative to the needs of employers in the late 1990s, many of whom were
small start-up companies, presents an obvious example. See Margaret Coles, IT
Stars Use Courts to Cast Off Chains, SuNDAY TIMES(London), Dec. 5, 1999, at 20
(noting that the "hot young talent in the information-technology world are 'more
akin to rock stars than to regular employees'" in suggesting that such employees
possess bargaining power and exercise it to refuse noncompetes); cf Callahan, supra
note 28, at 723 (arguing that the "solicitous treatment of employees assumes that
they are both fungible and overabundant" in criticizing courts' willingness to investigate the substance of noncompete agreement based on bargaining power concerns).
176 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
17 1 See Sterk, supra note 31, at 408-09 (suggesting that deficiencies in information
or lack of insight could lead employees to sign noncompetes that are against their
interest); Rena Mara Samole, Note, Real Employees: Cognitive Psychology and the
Adjudication of Non-Competition Agreements, 4 WASH.U. J.L. & PoL'Y 289, 307-08
(2000) (discussing bounds on employee knowledge or access to information relevant
to assessing whether to sign noncompete).
178 To the extent the employee does consider such issues, he or she may discount
the likelihood of the relationship terminating or of future competitive opportunities.
See Sterk, supra note 31, at 409; Samole, supra note 177, at 308-11 (examining cognitive capability of employees and suggesting that employees confronted with
noncompetes underestimate risks of agreement and are overly optimistic regarding
their own success).
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ship will develop. 179 Even so, the number of contingencies for
which the employer can expressly provide by contract is finite. 180
For all of these reasons, it may be inappropriate to view
noncompete terms as the product of reasoned reflection or as
dispositive of the parties' rights and obligations. The unreliability of the document as a formal contract is not a problem specific
to noncompete agreements, but one that is ubiquitous in longterm contracts contemplating a significant degree of personal involvement from the parties. Scholars in relational contract theory have long suggested that parties in ongoing commercial
relationships intend their contracts to be informally rewritten
over time and expect that their behavior will be governed by relational norms. 181 If that is the case, judicial enforcement of the
precise terms of their written agreements, without considering
the context in which enforcement is sought, may actually violate
the parties' contractual intent. This conclusion regarding longterm commercial contracts may be all the more convincing in the
employment context where the aim of the relationship is not the
sale of a tangible good, but rather the development and exploitation of the relationship itself. 182 The nature of employment, or
179 Even where the employer's needs and the relevant labor market suggest that
the employee has significant bargaining power, it is the employer who ultimately
controls the trajectory of the relationship since it controls its infrastructure, including such things as the delivery of training, structure of compensation systems, promotion hierarchy, and so forth. See CAPPELLI, supra note 117, at 3. Additionally,
the employer is much more likely to have access to counsel and to take the opportunity to make more reasoned decisions about the noncompete terms it wishes to offer. See Sterk, supra note 31, at 409.
180 It is impossible for employers and employees to specify in advance their precise expectations regarding their relationship, just as it would be impossible to write
down every job duty in a description of a particular position. See CAPPELLI, supra
note 117, at 18 (describing the "virtual impossibility of managing employees through
explicit contracts); cf Lester, supra note 3, at 65 n.75 (discussing the difficulty of
drafting to reflect all future contingencies and noting that lack of complete information may result in written contracts that contain vague, inaccurate or open terms).
181 Relational contract theory proceeds from the proposition that "contract is fundamentally about cooperative social behavior." Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract
Theory in Context, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 737, 743 (2000). It derives principally from
the scholarship of Ian Macneil. See, e.g., IAN MACNEIL, THE NEW SocJAL CONTRACT (1980): Macneil, Values in Contract, supra note 11; Ian Macneil, Economic

Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its Shortfalls and the Need for a "Rich Classificatory Apparatus," 75 Nw. U. L. REv. 1018 (1981) [hereinafter Macneil, Economic
Analysis). For additional commentary discussing relational values in contracting,
see Gude!, supra note 11, and Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of
Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 1089 (1981).
182 See Gude!, supra note 11, at 787-91; cf Hugh Collins, Market Power, Bureaucratic Power, and the Contract of Employment, 15 !Nous. L.J. I, 3 (1986) (noting
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any contract for ongoing personal services, is that the arrangement evolves over time to reflect changes in the needs and expectations of the parties. The employer and employee have limited
ability to formally describe all of the rights and obligations they
expect to attach to their relationship as of the point of its initiation, let alone provide for the myriad of contingencies that will
influence and affect their joint endeavor over time. 183 Reliance
on oral or informal agreements enables the parties to continually
readjust their obligations to one another in response to the dynamic factors that affect the workplace. 184
In the context of noncompetes, enforcement of a written
agreement may or may not accord with the parties' actual expectations. Enforcement of a noncompete to protect an investment
in training, for instance, would be consistent with the parties' implicit understanding where the employer contributes to the employee's professional development and the employee voluntarily
terminates employment before the investment has been "paid
back." But judicial enforcement of the precise terms of the
noncompete could subject the employee to restraints long after
he or she had purchased the training and experience provided
during the relationship. 185 Similarly, enforcement of a noncomthat the characterization of the employment relationship as a contract "fails to grasp
the nature of the social relationships involved").
183 See Samuel lssacharoff, Contracting for Employment: The Limited Return of
the Common Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1783, 1799 (1996) (describing sources of uncertainty that compromise parties' ability to express terms of employment at point of
hire); Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause in Employment at Will, 92 M1cH. L. REv. 8, 19-20 (1993) (describing parties' inability to negotiate detailed employment contract as a result of difficulties anticipating future
contingencies and difficulties monitoring and verifying performance of express
obligations).
184 Related to this concept is the idea of the "incomplete" contract in law and
economics literature. From the law and economics perspective, parties intentionally
leave out certain terms from their written contracts in order either to maintain flexibility in the face of future events or to avoid transaction costs associated with negotiating and drafting particular terms. Informational asymmetry may be one reason
why parties choose incomplete or implicit agreements over comprehensive contracts. See Schwartz, supra note 148, at 280 n.16 (1992); cf Goetz & Scott, supra
note 181, at 1091 (characterizing relational contracts as those in which parties are
incapable of reducing certain terms to writing either because of the inability to identify future conditions or because incorporation of known contingencies is too
complex).
185 See generally Lester, supra note 3, at 69 (discussing potential for opportunistic
behavior by employer in situations where employee departs after the employer has
recouped its financial investment in training). It is the timing of the employee's
departure that determines whether the attempt at enforcement accords with the par-
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pete would be consistent with the parties' implicit understanding
if used to enforce spot commitments to the organization. However, it would be inappropriate where the employee departed after completing a project or was involuntarily terminated for
cause or as a consequence of unforeseen market fluctuations. 186
Thus, noncompete enforcement is problematic because it offers employers the best of two worlds: relational and contractual.
Because they are formal contracts, noncompetes give the employer a guaranteed means of enforcing what would otherwise be
dependent on voluntary compliance, namely a legal remedy for
redressing employee defections where the employer sees fit to
ties' implicit understanding or constitutes a form of employer abuse. See id. ("[T]he
relevant question is not simply whether the employer made a costly investment in
training ... [but] whether one party has appropriated some of the value of the
training without paying for it.").
186 Whether employers may invoke noncompete protection against involuntarily
terminated employees has been debated extensively in the case law. Several courts
have held that the act of firing a worker extinguishes the employer's right to obtain
an injunction against competition. See, e.g., Rao v. Rao, 718 F.2d 219, 223 (7th Cir.
1983) (concluding that implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing
precludes employer enforcement of noncompete following unjustified termination
of employee); Insulation Corp. of Am. v. Brobston, 667 A.2d 729, 737 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1995) (concluding that method of termination is relevant factor to consider in
assessing reasonableness of noncompete in refusing to enforce agreement against
employee discharged for poor performance); see also Gallo, supra note 3, at 734-41
(analyzing courts' varying treatment of noncompete claims against involuntarily terminated workers). While this Article is chiefly concerned with employer efforts to
avoid employee defection, it bears noting that the judicial trend toward disallowing
enforcement in the involuntary termination context is consistent with the parties'
understanding of their implicit agreement and the limits of the employer's interest in
its workers. The act of terminating the employee belies the existence of any continued interest in the employee's skills, commitment, or services that could justify a
restraint, regardless of the employer's expectations at the outset of the relationship.
See Insulation Corp. of Am., 667 A.2d at 735 ("The employer who fires an employee
for failing to perform in a manner that promotes the employer's business interests
deems the employee worthless .... [W]e conclude that it is unreasonable as a matter
of law to permit the employer to retain unfettered control over that which it has
effectively discarded."). Indeed, in situations in which the employee is terminated
the implicit agreement of the new workplace specifically contemplates that the employee will be able to resell his human capital to competitors. See Stone, supra note
3, at 569-71; supra Part III.A. On the other hand, it may be necessary to distinguish
between those employees terminated for cause and those terminated without cause,
the rationale against noncompete enforcement applying only to the latter. Arguably, an employee who is terminated for breach of a term of an employment contract
or for violating the duty of loyalty, for instance by disclosing a trade secret, should
not be permitted to avoid application of an otherwise valid noncompete by engaging
in behavior that leads the employer to terminate him or her. See, e.g., Gismondi,
Paglia, Sherling, M.D. v. Franco, 104 F. Supp. 2d 223, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); cf Cray
v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 171, 178-79 (W.D.N.Y. 2001).
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exercise it On the other hand, since noncompetes do not contractually define any other aspect of the employment relationship, they create no legal obligation on the part of the employer
to fulfill any of its own commitments under the parties' implicit
understanding. From the perspective of the employee, this
means the noncompete contract provides no assurance that employers will pursue enforcement fairly, or even that the employer
will provide the training and experience it implicitly promised in
exchange for its restraint on the employee's mobility. Thus, the
value and the danger of unequivocal enforcement of noncompete
agreements is that it allows an employer to legally effect compliance with some aspects of the parties' understanding, while foreclosing the interactive process of redefining the terms of the
relationship that would otherwise protect the worker.

2.

Binding Agreements and the Viability of Preenforcement
Substantive Review

This disconnect between formalized agreements and implicit
understandings in the employment context supports the existing
sentiment that noncompete enforcement must be limited in some
measure to protect workers. It is not at all clear, however, that
substantive review of noncompetes in the context in which enforcement is sought is a desirable solution. Abandoning the protectable interest proxy in favor of a more open-ended evaluation
may result in a less contrived assessment of the parties' interests,
but it is likely to be at the expense of further increasing the uncertainty in the case law and reducing parties' incentives to craft
the terms of their agreements with care.
At the outset, evaluation of noncompetes at the time of enforcement requires some consensus on the nature of the substantive inquiry. An initial question is what rule or standard the
court should adopt in lieu of its current examination of the employer's protectable interest and the "reasonableness" of the restraint as a basis for determining whether enforcement is fair.
One option is for the court to identify and impose an efficient
outcome under the circumstances. 187 The court could assess the
value of the training and experience provided by the employer
and the value of the employee's work against the timing of the
187 See Schwartz, supra note 148, at 277-78 (discussing the law and economics
approach to contractual incompleteness which favors adoption of efficient rules to
supplement incomplete contracts).
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departure, and enforce the noncompete if the court determines
that the employer was not sufficiently compensated for its outlay.188 Alternatively, the court could enforce a result that accords with the parties' implicit understanding or with relevant
external norms. 189 The court could require, for instance, that the
parties establish the extracontractual terms of their relationship
and enforce the noncompete only upon demonstration that the
employee had violated an aspect of the shared understanding. 190
Leaving aside for the moment the question of which approach
achieves the more desirable outcome, 191it is unlikely that either
188See, e.g., MICHAELJ. TREBILOCK,THE COMMONLAW OF RESTRAINTOF
TRADE: A LEGALAND EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS147-48 (1986) (advocating a case-bycase approach to noncompete enforcement that inquires whether the employer has
lost out on an investment in human capital); see also Lester, supra note 3, at 69-70
(explaining this approach).
189While relational contract theory often refers generally to the role of relational
norms in judicial adjudication, at least some scholarship distinguishes between an
approach that focuses primarily on the unique expectations that arise during the
course of the parties' relationship and that which focuses on a transcendent concept
of substantive fairness derived from relevant societal norms. See Schwartz, supra
note 148, at 275-76 (distinguishing between "internal" and "external" relational approach to contractual incompleteness).
190 See, e.g., Macneil, Economic Analysis, supra note 181; Gillian K. Hadfield,
Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts, 42 STAN.
L. REv. 927 (1990); see also Schwartz, supra note 148, at 275-76. The outcome
under this approach would differ from that which would be reached under the efficiency-based approach in two scenarios. One would be where the employer had not
recouped the cost of its outlay but the employee did not share the understanding
that he would be required to stay. The other would be where the parties' understanding was that the employee would stay beyond the required time to recoup the
employer's investment because the employer had an interest in maintaining commitment for non-pecuniary reasons.
19 1 Although this debate concerns much of the literature on relational and incomplete contracts, see Schwartz, supra note 148, at 274-78 (suggesting that relational
contract theory and economic analysis of "incomplete" contracts offer alternative
means of addressing the shared problem of contract interpretation under circumstances that appear not to have been contemplated by the parties), it is not clear that
the choice of approach will effect differing results in most cases. It has been argued
for instance, that the parties to commercial relationships generally expect and intend
that each will seek to maximize self-interest, which supports the conclusion that reliance on internal norms of the relationship will yield the result otherwise achieved by
selecting terms that maximize efficiency. See id. at 276-77. Similarly, some scholars
have predicted that principles of fairness, what might be considered the source of
external norms, will increasingly reflect concerns of efficiency and maximization of
joint gain under the theory that what is efficient is objectively fair. See Schwab,
supra note 126, at 34. On the other hand, there appear to be some instances where
the means selected will alter the ends achieved. Employees may know their employer intends to invest in worker training in order to maximize profits but not know
or share in the understanding that a definitive commitment to remaining on the job
is required for the employer to realize the benefit of its investment. Similarly, a
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lays the foundation for a workable rule. The efficiency-based approach would require the court to engage in economically sophisticated valuations of the worker's marginal product relative to
the investment of the employer. Executing such calculations in
specific cases that may well prove infeasible. 192 Neither is it apparent how a court would define appropriate external norms or
undertake an inquiry into the substance of an implicit agreement.
The success of such an approach would be dependent on the parties' ability to prove the content of oral statements and substantiate their subjective understandings. Thus, in either of these
cases, the specificity or subjectivity of the requisite inquiry would
make it virtually impossible for parties to predict whether a particular agreement would be found enforceable at any given point
in the parties' relationship.
Indeed, any of these forms of judicial review may have the perverse effect of diluting the significance that the parties might otherwise attach to their written terms. Particularly where a
jurisdiction will revise an agreement deemed unfair, employers
have an incentive to request more protection than what would
appear reasonable. 193 In effect, by looking to the circumstances
in which enforcement is sought, the law perpetuates a cycle in
which parties fail to meaningfully consider the consequences of
the terms they select or engage in serious negotiation, which in
turn makes judicial intervention necessary.
Because of the difficulties of finding a workable standard for
shared norm may develop that requires the employee to remain on the job for personal or other non-pecuniary reasons beyond the time necessary for the employer to
recoup its monetary outlay.
192 See Lester, supra note 3, at 70 (calling such an approach the "optimal rule in a
first-best world" but questioning courts' ability to carry it out). The problem of judicial competency to determine efficient ex ante results has been a central concern of
the law and economics literature on gap-filling in incomplete contracts. See, e.g.,
Gillian K. Hadfield, Judicial Competence and the Interpretation of Incomplete Contracts, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 159, 162 (1994) (suggesting that generalist courts have
limited ability to determine efficient outcomes); cf Schwartz, supra note 148, at 27980 (suggesting that parties contract with knowledge that certain information will be
observable to them but incapable of verification before a court). But see Eric Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical Judicial Error, 94 Nw.
U. L. REv. 749, 762-69 (2000) (arguing that creating legally enforceable contracts
deters highly opportunistic behavior even though courts lack competency to enforce
them properly).
193 See Closius & Schaffer, supra note 82, at 547 (suggesting that judicial rewriting
strategies "encourage employers to be 'unreasonable' because there is, in effect, no
sanction for being unreasonable"); see generally supra Part LB (describing "bluepencil" approach to over broad noncompete agreements).
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review, some commentators have suggested abandoning the use
of noncompete agreements to protect employers' interests in
people in favor of adopting "pay back" agreements designed specifically to reimburse the employer for the cost of training. 194
While prohibiting any type of contractual protection for training
appears inconsistent with the recognition of the value of human
capital to employers, an effort to limit that protection based on
the form of the agreement does offer some advantages. "Pay
back" agreements tend to be drafted more narrowly than
noncompetes in that they require employee repayment of specific costs only in the event the employee departs within a designated time period. By limiting the duration of the employee's
repayment obligation ex ante, such agreements in theory prevent
the employer from redefining the terms of the understanding at
the time of enforcement. Enforcement of such agreements
should therefore be less onerous, or at least less surprising, to
employees.
However, repayment agreements ultimately raise many of the
same practical problems associated with noncompetes. Since it is
the uncommon situation in which the parties discuss or attempt
to anticipate the extent of the employer's investment or the
length of the employee's commitment, the terms of the agreement are unlikely to be any more "fair" than those of a noncompete. The goal of requiring specifically drafted contracts may be
to preclude any contractual agreement where such information is
unknown, but it is equally likely that the employer will request
such an agreement regardless, utilizing speculative terms to preserve the possibility of enforcement in the face of uncertainty. If
at the time of the employee's departure the required payments
prove more costly than the value of the employee's unreimbursed human capital, enforcement of the pay back provision is no less burdensome to the employee than the noncompete
agreement. 195 Indeed, if the payments required are substantial,
194See, e.g., Kraus, supra note 80; Lester, supra note 3, at 75-76; cf Rubin &
Shedd, supra note 82, at 100-07 (advocating continuation of existing rule limiting
noncompete enforceability and against extending protection to other forms of training in order to avoid opportunities for overreaching). At least one state has adopted
such an approach through legislation. In Colorado, employers are statutorily authorized to require employees who depart within two years of hire to repay the cost
of their training. See Cow. REv. STAT. § 8-2-113(2)(c) (2001).
195 One can argue that a repayment agreement is less onerous than a noncompete
because the subsequent employer can easily assume the employee's contractual obligation. Yet noncompete agreements are themselves only slightly less amenable to
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the agreement may prove more constraining because it forces the
employee to produce cash and provides no option to comply with
the agreement by refraining from competitive employment. 196
Thus, unless there is reason to trust the process by which the
terms of such agreements are chosen, they are potentially as
problematic as noncompetes and arguably should be subjected to
the same form of judicial review at the time enforcement is
sought. 197
IV
TOWARD

A FORMATION-BASED
JUDICIAL

MODEL

OF

ENFORCEMENT

It remains to be considered whether a viable doctrinal approach can be found to assess the appropriateness of enforcement in individual cases. Such an approach should recognize the
parties' ability to purchase and sell human capital as a component of their employment contract, but limit to some degree employers' ability to impose and enforce terms that go beyond
protection of their legitimate needs or violate agreed upon
norms. Ideally, that approach should also enhance consistency
and predictability in the case law.
While an administerable rule that achieves all of these ends
may ultimately prove elusive, the following section offers some
preliminary doctrinal suggestions. In so doing, it returns to basic
contract principles and defenses as a means of determining
whether enforcement of the express terms of an agreement is justifiable despite its potentially harsh effects. To that end, the Article examines a formation-based model of enforcement proposed
such a resolution. It is in fact commonplace among a certain class of employees for
the poaching company to pay the employee's way out of an existing restraint. The
situation with which the law must be concerned, of course , is that of the employee
who has no such opportunity or is chilled in his or her efforts to find future work
because of the existence of the agreement.
196 While relatively few judicial opinions involving repayment agreements have
been handed down, the highly disfavorable treatment they have received suggests
that courts share such concerns . See , e.g., Brunner v. Hand Indus. , 603 N.E.2d 157,
159 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (refusing to enforce repayment agreement under which
defecting employee was required to reimburse employer $20,000 for training in
treating orthopedic products).
197 An alternative may be to establish legislative limitations on such agreements.
See Lester, supra note 3, at 76 (proposing the possibility of a cap on training costs
and other statutory limitations). It is unclear, however, whether a single legislative
scheme could account for the wide range of variables that will determine the appropriateness of such agreements in different situations across different industries.
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by uniform domestic relations law to deal with the analogous
problem of premarital agreements. Such a model rigorously examines contractual assent and the context in which it occurs to
ensure that the parties' adoption of a written agreement represents a reasoned choice to reject flexibility in favor of legally fixing their obligations. The Article concludes by considering how a
formation-based model of enforcement applied to noncompete
agreements might achieve a more consistent approach to enforcement, one that strikes a balance between a pure freedom-ofcontract ideals and an approach that seeks to enforce the implicit
terms of the parties' relationship to achieve a substantively fair
result.
A.

Existing Limits on Contractual Enforceability

One way of crafting an alternative approach to noncompetes
that avoids a contextualized substantive analysis at the time of
enforcement is to return to fundamental contract principles in
assessing how such agreements are formed. While contract law
obviously does not contemplate review of the effects of enforcement, it does establish basic prerequisites and defenses to enforcement that in theory assure that parties willingly accepted the
risks inherent in their agreement. In this respect, the concepts of
assent and consideration are threshold requirements whose presence indicates that both parties agreed to their written terms pursuant to a true exchange.
The available defenses of duress and unconscionability focus
on these basic ideas of consent and exchange in contract formation. The duress defense allows a party to escape contractual liability where that party's acceptance of the agreement occurred
under circumstances that impaired the meaningfulness of his or
her consent-for instance, where the party is threatened or coerced.198 In the same way, the unconscionability doctrine looks
at the terms of the agreement and the process through which
they were reached to limit enforceability where the contract was
unlikely to have been the product of knowing agreement. The
198 See, e.g., Rissman v. Rissman, 213 F.3d 381, 386 (7th Cir. 2000) (defining duress as a condition where one party is induced to contract by means of a wrongful act
or threat); King v. Donnkenny Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 736, 738 (W.D. Va. 2000) (defining duress as the application of "undue pressure in a contractual bargaining process."); Wolfe v. C.S.P.H., Inc., 24 S.W.3d 641, 645 (Tex. App. 2000) (observing that
duress requires proof of a threat to do something which the threatening party has no
right to do).
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doctrine takes into account procedural concerns such as the
knowledgeableness and bargaining skill of the parties, 199 as well
as the use of fine print and complex language to obscure unfavorable terms. 200 It also looks to the substantive terms of exchange
to see if they were unduly favorable to one side as of the time of
formation. 201 Thus, some scholars have suggested that existing
contract principles sufficiently address concerns about the fairness of noncompete agreements and that any inquiry into enforceability should be limited to an analysis of these defenses. 202
The problem with reliance on these contract principles and defenses as the sole bases for reviewing noncompetes is that courts
tend to employ these doctrines with hesitation and only in very
limited circumstances. The duress defense requires an actual or
implied threat of loss or harm that leaves the "victim" of duress
with "no reasonable alternative" but to accept the demands of
the party with the superior bargaining position. 203 Such threats,
199 See, e.g., Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Budd Morgan Cent. Station Alarm
Co., 95 F. Supp. 2d 118, 121 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting that factors considered in assessing unconscionability include the experience and education of the aggrieved
party as well as any disparity in the bargaining power); In re Turner Bros. Trucking
Co., 8 S.W.3d 370, 376 (Tex. App. 1999) (finding agreement unconscionable where
aggrieved party had difficulty understanding its terms); Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores,
Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 403 (Utah 1998) (noting that factors bearing on unconscionability
include whether each party had a reasonable opportunity to understand the contract
terms and whether the contract terms were explained to the weaker party).
200 See, e.g., Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 95 F. Supp. 2d at 121; Monscatiello v.
Pittsburgh Contractors Equip. Co., 595 A.2d 1190, 1196-97 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)
(finding fine print warranty disclaimer unconscionable).
201 See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 689-91
(Cal. 2000) (holding preemployment application forms containing mandatory arbitration clauses unconscionable because terms were so favorable to employer);
Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 95 F. Supp. 2d at 121 (observing that substantive unconscionability requires determining if the contract terms were unreasonably
favorable to the party against whom unconscionability is urged); Ryan, 972 P.2d at
402 (same).
202 See, e.g., Callahan, supra note 28, at 725-27 ( concluding that unconscionability
defense provides an appropriately limited mechanism for protecting genuinely disadvantaged employees); Sterk, supra note 31, at 405-12 (finding traditional concerns
about bargaining power and anticompetitive behavior insufficient to justify treating
exchanges of human capital pursuant to noncompete agreements different from
other contractually alienable property interests). But see Closius & Schaffer, supra
note 82, at 548-49 (suggesting that contract rules should be subordinated to agency
rules in evaluating noncompetes and arguing that enforcement should be permitted
only where the employee's fiduciary obligations provide a basis for the restraint).
203 See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)OF CONTRACTS§175(1) (1981) (stating that duress exists where contractual assent is induced by "an improper threat by the other
party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative"); accord Contempo Design,
Inc. v. Chicago & Northeast Ill. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 226 F.3d 535, 551 (7th
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however loosely defined, would rarely, if ever, accompany an
employer's request for a noncompete in the ordinary employment case. Similarly, unconscionability is applied only to those
situations in which both the unfairness of the terms and the circumstances under which they were reached combine to shock the
conscience of the court. While such a standard would capture
the "lifetime" covenant and other palpably excessive restraints, it
would not touch the vast majority of noncompete provisions.
It seems unlikely, therefore, that an approach constrained by
existing contract law applicable to a wide range of agreements
will offer a viable solution to the problem of noncompete enforcement. While such an approach offers consistency and assures that the most egregious agreements are stricken, it does not
account for the questions posed by the long-term and open-ended nature of the employment relationship and its impact on the
concepts of consent and exchange. In the absence of circumstances that rise to the level of duress or unconscionability, basic
contract law deems the signature of the employee evidence of
assent and the offer of employment sufficient consideration for
the employee's concession, irrespective of the limitations on enforcement that the parties may have implicitly assumed.
It does seems reasonable, however, to consider the possibility
of enhancing the existing contractual inquiry to allow for a more
careful review of contractual intent and issues peculiar to the formation of noncompete agreements. Appropriately, the point of
the duress and unconscionability defenses is to avoid enforcement of agreements where both the terms and the process of
reaching the agreement betray an absence of meaningful choice
on one side. Having accepted the need for some judicial intervention in enforcement, an analysis of contract formation issues
that is somewhat more rigorous than that which exists under current law may be less offensive to freedom of contract principles
than a review that hinges on the substantive effects of enforcement. Since the historical debate about noncompete enforcement stems from concerns about bargaining power, analysis of
Cir. 2000); see also Rissman, 213 F.3d at 386 (defining duress as a condition where
one is induced to contract under circumstances depriving him of his free will); Fred
Ehrlich, P.C. v. Tullo, 710 N.Y.S.2d 572, 573 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (same); Milgrim
v. Backroads, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 471, 475-76 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting that where
aggrieved party has alternative choice for redress, any claim of duress must fail);
Vail/Arrowhead, Inc. v. Dist. Ct. for the Fifth Judicial Dist., 954 P.2d 608,613 (Colo.
1998) (same).
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the process by which these agreements are reached and the context in which they are formed in fact seems particularly apposite.
The following section looks at the law of premarital agreements
as an area in which courts rigorously consider issues of consent
and unconscionability in contract formation in order to strike a
balance in enforcing agreements that raise similar substantive
fairness concerns.

B.

The Premarital Agreement Analogy

The premarital agreement, like a noncompete, is an effort to
determine at the outset of a legal relationship the consequences
of its termination. Coincident with the emergence of the new
social contract of employment, the marital institution itself underwent significant changes in the latter part of the twentieth
century. As a result of the creation of no fault divorce laws in
the 1970s, divorce became increasingly accessible and consequently more prevalent among all segments of the population. 204
The rising rates of divorce and remarriage in modern society
have led many couples to consider more carefully their economic
futures in advance of marriage and attempt to plan for the contingency of marital dissolution through contract. 205 As in the em204 See June C. Carbone, Economics , Feminism, and the Reinvention of Alimony:
A Reply to Ira Ellman, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1463 , 1493 (1990) (suggesting that no-fault
divorce eliminated both the stigma and financial disincentives associated with divorce, leading to increase in divorce rates); Raymond C. O ' Brien, The Reawakening
of Marriage, 102 W . VA. L. REv. 339,355 (1999) (estimating that no-fault divorce
accounted for about one-fifth of the total increase in divorce rates between 1968 and
1988, and noting that between 1960 and 1990, the divorce rate in the United States
doubled). Indeed , the unprecedented surge in divorce rates has given rise to a modern reform movement that advocates the adoption of "covenant marriages" and
other fault-based initiatives. See Lynn D . Wardle, Divorce Reform at the Turn of the
Millennium: Certainties and Possibilities, 33 FAM. L.Q. 783, 785-90 (1999) (noting
public criticism of existing no-fault divorce laws and describing recent legislative
reforms adopted in Louisiana and Arizona). For a brief summary of the history of
American divorce law and the rise of the no-fault regime, see O'Brien , supra , at 35257.
205 See Cory Adams , Part 3: Getting Married: Premarital Agreements , 11 J . CoNTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 121, 122 (2000) (noting that sixty percent divorce rate forces
couples to consider the likelihood of marital dissolution and suggesting that "serial
spouse[s]" who have children from a prior marriage and/or substantial assets are
likely to seek the protection of a prenuptial agreement); Leah Guggenheimer , A
Modest Proposal: The Feminomics of Drafting Premarital Agreements , 17 WoMEN 's
R-rs . L. REP. 147, 149 (1996) (suggesting that increase in second marriages and the
increased tendency to marry later in life lead to greater reliance on premarital agreements); Allison A . Marston, Planning for Love: The Politics of Prenuptual Agreements , 49 STAN. L. REv. 887, 891 (1997) (suggesting various reasons for the
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ployment context, would-be marital partners recognize that
despite best intentions they are not guaranteed lifetime security
in their relationships. 206
From a legal and policy perspective, the history of premarital
agreements is a tortured one that traces some of the same paths
as the law of noncompete enforceability. Initially, premarital
agreements that dictated the terms of marital dissolution were
deemed void as a matter of public policy. 207 The reasons were
two-fold. Premarital agreements were perceived as denigrating
marriage and even encouraging divorce. 208 More importantly,
increased use of premarital agreements, including the prevalence of divorce and remarriage and the increase in individual assets brought by women to marriage as a
consequence of their rising participation in the labor market and likelihood of marrying later in life than in past decades).
Z06 Cf CAPPELLI,supra note 117, at 2-3 ("If the traditional, lifetime employment
relationship was like a marriage, then the new employment relationship is like a
lifetime of divorces and remarriages, a series of close relationships governed by the
expectation going in that they need to be made to work, and yet will inevitably not
last.").
207 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Reynolds, 123 S.E.2d 115, 132 (Ga. 1961); In re Marriage
of Gudenkauf, 204 N.W.2d 586,587 (Iowa 1973); Crouch v. Crouch, 385 S.W.2d 288,
293 (Tenn. 1964); Fricke v. Fricke, 42 N.W.2d 500, 502 (Wis. 1950). By contrast,
agreements governing property distribution upon death of a spouse were generally
considered acceptable. See, e.g., In re Cantrell's Estate, 119 P.2d 483, 486 (Kan.
1941); Gartner v. Gartner, 74 N.W.2d 809, 812 (Minn. 1956); Buettner v. Buettner,
505 P.2d 600, 603 (Nev. 1973); see also Gross v. Gross, 464 N.E.2d 500, 504 (Ohio
1984) (describing historical distinction between the two forms of premarital agreements and noting that agreements providing for property disposal upon a spouse's
death were generally recognized as "conducive to marital tranquility" and upheld on
the basis of "the spouses' interest in the preservation of their respective estates, and
their reasonable desire to avoid disputes regarding such property after one spouse
has died").
208 It was believed that the sacredness of entering a marital union was offended by
discussions of its possible demise. See Marston, supra note 205, at 897 (summarizing
rationales for judicial non-enforcement of premarital agreements prior to 1970);
Milton C. Regan, Jr., Marriage at the Millenium, 33 FAM. L.Q. 647,649 (1999) (explaining that courts typically declined enforcement of premarital agreements for fear
that such contracts were deleterious to the union or could cause parties to treat the
marriage commitment lightly); see also Barbara Ann Atwood, Ten Years Later: Lingering Concerns About the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, 19 J. LEGIS. 127, 136
(1993). The perception that premarital agreements encouraged divorce was based
on the fear that such agreements removed the husband's legal obligation of support
upon divorce, thereby creating a financial incentive for husbands to leave their
wives. See Crouch, 385 S.W.2d at 293 ("Such contract could induce a mercenary
husband to inflict on his wife any wrong he might desire with the knowledge his
pecuniary liability would be limited."); Cumming v. Cumming, 102 S.E. 572,575 (Va.
1920) (noting that upholding these agreements "would be to invite disagreement,
encourage separation, incite divorce proceedings, ... and destroy every principle of
the law of marriage, requiring that husband and wife shall live together during their
natural lives, and that the husband, within his financial ability, shall furnish the wife
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courts questioned the quality of the bargaining process through
which such agreements were reached, presuming that wives-to-be
did not have the ability or presence of mind to provide contractual consent. 209 Courts feared that women, confronted with the
superior bargaining power of their husbands, would unwittingly
contract away their right to support, just as they feared workers
might contract away their ability to earn a living.
In the last thirty years, however, these sentiments have given
way to tempered acceptance. Courts have rejected the contention that premarital agreements encourage divorce 210 and have
taken a less gendered view of their effect on women. 211 At the
with reasonable necessaries for her support"); Fricke, 42 N.W.2d at 502 ("In every
civilized country [there is] the obligation, sacred as well as lawful, of a husband to
protect and provide for his family, and to sustain the [premarital agreement] would
be to invest him with a right to be both a faithless husband and a vicious citizen .") .
209 See Stilley v. Folger , 14 Ohio 610, 648 (1846).
What person so exposed to imposition as a woman, contracting ,[sic] personally , with her intended husband , just on the eve of marriage , at a time
when all prudential considerations are likely to be merged in a confiding
attachment, or suppressed from an honorable instinct and sentiment of delicacy. Surely, it would be a reproach to the law, if the very virtues and
graces of woman were thus allowed to become the successful means of
overreaching and defrauding them in bargains.
Id.
210 See, e.g., Brooks v. Brooks, 733 P.2d 1044, 1050 (Alaska 1987) (finding idea
that premarital agreements induce divorce "anachronistic " and concluding that "allowing couples to think through the financial aspects of their marriage beforehand
can only foster strength and permanency in that relationship "); Gross , 464 N.E.2d at
506 ("[W]e conclude that the modern trends of marriage and divorce across the
country dictate that reasonable laws must be forthcoming to accommodate these
changing social attitudes . It may be reasonably concluded that [premarital] agreements tend to promote or facilitate marriage, rather than encourage divorce."). Oc•
casionally, however , courts will reject an agreement where it is perceived as
bestowing an advantage on a party that chooses to divorce. See , e.g., In re Marriage
of Noghrey, 215 Cal. Rptr. 153, 156 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (voiding prenuptial agreement giving wife $500,000 in the event of divorce because wife was thereby "en·
couraged by the very terms of the agreement to seek a dissolution"). It has
therefore been argued that the modern interpretation of this issue has the perverse
effect of voiding those agreements that provide benefits beyond that which ordinary
marital property rules would permit while permitting agreements that are less
favorable to the waiving party , usually the wife. See Atwood , supra note 208, at
136-37.
211 Potter v. Collin , 321 So. 2d 128, 132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App . 1975) ("In this day and
age there is no longer any suggestion that women are unequal and in need of the
protective arm of the court. "); Osborn v. Osborn , 226 N.E .2d 814, 819 (Ohio Ct.
Com. Pl. 1966) (finding judicial emphasis on women 's lack of bargaining power outdated in light of women's increased status in contemporary society); Simeone v.
Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1990) (noting that "women are no longer regarded
as the 'weaker' party in marriage ... [n]or is there validity in the presumption that
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same time, they continue to recognize the uniqueness of marriage relative to other contractual relationships, how that impacts
the parties' ability to bargain, and the difficulties inherent in contracting in advance for future contingencies within a marriage. 212
The question has been how to account for these problems in creating a standard for judicial intervention. Historically, the law
has focused on a contextualized assessment of the substantive effects of the premarital agreement's terms, much like the current
law of noncompete enforcement. In particular, where the agreement purports to limit a spouse's right to support, courts have
traditionally held that the allocation provided to that spouse
must be reasonable for the agreement to be enforceable. 213
Thus, agreements providing for a waiver of all inheritance rights
or a relinquishment of any claim to alimony by a dependent
spouse have frequently been set aside. 214
In addition to this line of inquiry, however , the law of premarital agreements has also focused heavily on issues of procedural
fairness in the formation of the contract. A prevalent factor in
assessing the enforceability of property allocations, for instance,
is whether there was a full disclosure of assets by the party seekwomen are uninformed, uneducated , and readily subjected to unfair advantage in
marital agreements") ; see also Marston , supra note 205, at 897-98 (noting decrease
in court expressions of paternalism toward women correlating with increase in enforcement of premarital agreements) .
212 See In re Marriage of Bonds , 5 P.3d 815, 829 (Cal. 2000) (noting that unlike
commercial agreements that operate as a guide to achieving a joint objective , a premarital agreement is formed with the "a nticipat(ion] that it never will be invoked"
and "exists to provide for eventualities that will arise only if the relationship founders, possibly in the distant future under greatly changed and unforeseeable circumstances") ; AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLE
S OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS ANO RECOMMENDATIONS§ 7.02 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No . 4, 2000)
[hereinafter PRINCIPLE
S] ("Parties ent ering a family relationship have expectations
about their future partn er that may disarm their capacity for self-protective judgment, or their inclination to exercise it, as compared to parties negotiating other
kinds of contracts.").
213 See, e.g., Newman v. Newman , 653 P.2d 728, 736 (Colo . 1982); Scherer v.
Scherer , 292 S.E.2d 662, 666 (Ga. 1982); Osborne v. Osborne, 428 N.E .2d 810, 816
(Mass . 1981); Osborn , 226 N.E.2d at 817; In re Estate of Geyer, 533 A.2d 423, 428
(Pa. 1987); Whitney v. Seattle-First Nat '! Bank, 579 P.2d 937, 940 (Wash . 1978).
214 See , e.g., Lutgert v. Lutgert, 338 So. 2d 1111, 1117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976);
Eule v. Eule, 320 N.E .2d 506,510 (Ill. App . Ct. 1974); Johnson v. Johnson , No . 3-9150, 1992 WL 209320, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App . Aug. 26, 1992); Bloomfield v. Bloomfield ,
723 N.Y.S.2d 143, 146 (N .Y. App. Div. 2001). rev 'd, 97 N.Y.2d 188 (N .Y. 2001); see
also Matter of Marriage of Matson. 730 P.2d 668, 672 (Wash. 1986) (noting that in
the event an agreement "attempts to eliminate, totally . community property rights,
the court must zealously and scrupulously examine it for fairness").
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ing enforcement. 215 Courts stress that for the agreement to withstand challenge, the spouse opposing enforcement must have
signed the agreement knowingly and voluntarily. 216 Some courts
have suggested that the waiving spouse must not only be informed of the financial position of the partner seeking enforcement, but must also be cognizant of his or her rights to support
and property. 217 Thus, while there is no requirement of review
by independent counsel, whether the waiving party had the opportunity to consult with an attorney is a factor to be considered
in determining enforceability. 218 Furthermore, courts reviewing
premarital agreements will frequently look to case-specific indicators of fairness in the bargaining process in making an assessment of voluntariness.
For instance, the timing of the
presentation of the agreement to the waiving spouse may impact
enforcement: Courts are inclined to reject agreements presented
too close to the time of the wedding to afford an opportunity for
meaningful reflection. 219 Finally, courts look directly at the rela215 See, e.g., In re Estate of Ingmand, No. 00-1281, 2001 WL 855406, at *2 (Iowa
Ct. App. July 31, 2001); McKee-Johnson v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 259, 266 (Minn.
1989); Simeone, 581 A .2d at 167; Whitney, 579 P.2d at 939; see also Gross, 464
N.E.2d at 506 (noting that premarital agreement is valid and enforceable where,
inter alia, "there was a full disclosure, or full knowledge, and understanding, [sic) of
the nature, value and extent of the prospective spouse's property").
216 See, e.g., Potter v. Collin, 321 So. 2d 128, 132 (Fla . Dist. Ct. App. 1975);
Rinvelt v. Rinvelt, 475 N.W.2d 478,481 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); McKee-Johnson, 444
N.W.2d at 265; Lester v. Lester, 87 N.Y.S.2d 517, 521 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1949);
Whitney, 579 P.2d at 939; Osborn, 226 N.E.2d at 817; Gant v. Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106,
114 (W. Va. 1985).
217 See , e.g., Geyer, 533 A.2d at 429 (noting that sufficient disclosure to sustain
validity of premarital agreement "must include both the general financial pictures of
the parties involved, and evidence that the parties are aware of the statutory rights
which they are relinquishing") ; Matson, 730 P.2d at 673 (noting in voiding prenuptial
agreement that wife did not have "even a minimal understanding of the legal consequences of the rights she was signing away").
21s See, e.g., Lutgen, 338 So. 2d at 1117 (finding agreement unenforceable where
wife was presented with agreement twenty-four hours before the wedding and was
not afforded an opportunity to consult with an attorney); Fletcher v. Fletcher, 628
N.E.2d 1343, 1348 (Ohio 1994) ("[W)hen an antenuptial agreement provides disproportionately less than the party would receive under an equitable distribution, the
party financially disadvantaged must have a meaningful opportunity to consult with
counsel. "); cf McKee-Johnson , 444 N.W.2d at 266 (finding no procedural unfairness
where wife waived her right to counsel and so acknowledged in the agreement); see
also UNIF. PREMARITALAGREEMENTAcr § 6 cmt., 9C U.L.A. 49-50 (2001) (noting
that lack of assistance of counsel may be one factor in determining whether the
statutory preconditions to enforceability of a premarital agreement are met).
219 See Lutgert, 338 So. 2d at 1116 (voiding agreement where husband "sprang the
agreement upon [his future wife] and demanded its execution within twenty-four
hours of the wedding"); Bauer v. Bauer, 464 P.2d 710, 712 (Or. Ct. App. 1970) (in-
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tive sophistication of the parties. Where a court deems the waiving spouse to be knowledgeable and experienced, his or her
relinquishment of rights may be found enforceable despite the
fact that the agreement's provisions would otherwise seem
unfair. 220
While the law in this area continues to consist of a review of
both the substantive effects of enforcement and the contract formation process, the trend appears to be in favor of less of the
former and more of the latter. In 1983, in response to concerns
about uncertainty and inconsistency in the enforcement of premarital agreements, the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform Laws promulgated the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (UPAA). 221 Substantially adopted by twenty-six
states, 222 the UPAA adopts a standard of enforcement that focuses almost entirely on contract formation issues, but which still
accounts for circumstances peculiar to marriage. Its purpose is to
enhance the enforceability
and reliability of premarital
agreements.
The UPAA provides that a premarital agreement is enforceable unless (1) it was not executed voluntarily, or (2) it was unconscionable at the time it was entered into and the party opposing
enforcement did not know of or receive fair disclosure of his or
her partner's assets. 223 Voluntariness, the primary issue in chalvalidating prenuptial agreement where wife was not advised of agreement until she
was en route to the wedding); Matson, 730 P.2d at 672 (voiding prenuptial agreement because wife was required to sign contract on her wedding day, only three days
after it was first presented to her).
220 See, e.g.. Hengel v. Hengel, 365 N.W.2d 16, 20 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) (noting
that the wife was "moderately sophisticated in financial matters. that she was made
aware of the contents of financial statements and. [sic] that she had independent
knowledge of the substantial size of [husband's] estate before the marriage" in finding premarital agreement enforceable); Gant v. Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106, 116 (W. Va.
1985) (finding premarital agreement reasonable and enforceable despite wife's
waiver of all alimony rights where "[b]oth parties were middle-aged, both had been
married before, and the divorce occurred sufficiently close in time ... to the signing
of the agreement"); Potter, 321 So. 2d at 132 (finding premarital agreement enforceable where wife "was an educated woman with experience in the world of business
and with experience in divorce and property settlement agreements" and chose to
sign agreement against advice of counsel).
221 For a discussion of the debate leading to the Commissioners' adoption of the
UPAA standard, see In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 815, 823-26 (Cal. 2000).
222 Nat'! Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Drafts of Uniform and Model Acts, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc_frame.htm
(last visited May 17, 2002).
223 UNIF. PREMARITAL
AGREEMENTAcr § 6, 9C U.L.A. 48-49 (2001).
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lenging enforcement, looks to the quality of consent at the time
of drafting. While not defined in the uniform law, the term has
been interpreted as embracing many of the special procedural
issues considered at common law, including coercion based on
surprise or proximity to the parties' wedding, the presence or
availability of counsel, knowledgeableness and sophistication of
the waiving party, and whether there was a disclosure of assets.224 In this way, the UPAA standard contemplates the ability
to set aside an agreement for reasons beyond those which would
justify a duress defense in a commercial context. 225 On the other
hand, it limits inquiry into the substantive effects of the terms,
choosing to evaluate substance through the lens of unconscionability rather than the common law reasonableness standard. 226
224 The most sustained assessment of the UPAA voluntariness standard is the recent California Supreme Court's decision in In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d at 82425, which discusses such factors. For additional discussion, see Schwarz v. Schwarz,
No. 01-99-01365-CV, 2000 WL 1708518, at *2-3 (Tex. App. Nov. 16, 2000); Donovan
v. Donovan, No. 159622, 1999 WL 1499141, at *3-4 (Va. Cir. Ct. Sept. 28, 1999). In
addition, the most recent tentative draft of the American Law Institute's Principles
of the Law of Family Dissolution enumerates similar factors as relevant to determining whether a party's consent was "informed and not obtained under duress," the
standard for enforceability adopted therein. PRINCIPLES,supra note 212, § 7.05(2).
Specifically, under the ALI draft, where the parties are independently represented
and sign the agreement at least thirty days before the marriage, a rebuttable presumption arises that the consent/no-duress requirement is satisfied. Id. § 7.05(3); see
also Brian H. Bix, Premarital Agreements in the ALI Principles of Family Dissolution, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & PoL'Y 231, 236-37 (2001) (discussing the ALi's "procedural requirements" for the enforcement of premarital agreements).
225See Bonds, 5 P.3d at 830.
[W]e believe the reference to voluntariness in the Uniform [Premarital
Agreement] Act was intended to convey an element of knowing waiver
that is not a consistent feature of commercial contact enforcement ... [and]
that subtle coercion that would not be considered in challenges to ordinary
commercial contracts may be considered in the context of the premarital
agreement.
Id.; cf PRINCIPLES,supra note 212, § 7.05 cmt. b (contrasting adopted procedural
requirements with traditional doctrine of duress that applies "only in very extreme
cases of pressure" judged on the basis of objective circumstances).
226See UNIF. PREMARITALAGREEMENTAcr § 6(a)(2), 9C U.L.A. 49 (2001). The
comments to the UPAA indicate that this is the same standard that applies to ordinary commercial contracts. See id. § 6 cmt., 9C U.L.A. 49-50 (2001). However, because the general inquiry into unconscionability contemplates a close examination of
all facts and circumstances, consideration of unconscionability in the context of premarital agreement formation would likely take account of features peculiar to the
relationship of intended marital partners. See id. ("In the context of negotiations
between spouses as to the financial incidents of their marriage, the [unconsionability] standard includes protection against overreaching, concealment of assets,
and sharp dealing not consistent with the obligations of marital partners to deal fairly
with each other.") (emphasis added).
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Significantly, the UPAA inquiry focuses on the circumstances
that existed at the time of drafting, rather than the effect of the
agreement at the time of enforcement as under some states'
traditional common law standard. 227 Other than in narrow instances in which a party is in danger of becoming a public charge,
the court is not to set aside a contract voluntarily agreed to
merely because its terms ultimately prove harsh toward one of
the parties under the circumstances existing at the time of
enforcement. 228
Thus, the UPAA aspires to a uniform formation-based assessment of the validity of premarital agreements, the defining feature of which is a searching examination of the circumstances
surrounding the agreement process. To be sure, the proposed
legislation has its critics, who argue for continued judicial review
of the substantive effects of the agreement in light of the circumstances at the time of enforcement, particularly where the agreement limits a party's rights to spousal support. 229 What the
UPAA suggests, however, is that unfair results do not themselves
form a basis for nonenforcement. Rather, terms that are unconscionable at the time of drafting can be an indication of lack of
consent in accordance with the traditional contract defense.
While it is too soon to say whether the sort of fairness review that
examines consequences of enforcement will be entirely eliminated, the trend in the courts appears decidedly in favor of nor221 Id. § 6(a)(2), 9C U.L.A. 49 (2001). The ALI Principles of Family Dissolution
take an approach slightly more favorable to the party seeking to avoid the agreement, but which similarly limits inquiry into the substantive effects of the agreement.
Pursuant to section 7.07 a court may not enforce a term of the parties' premarital
agreement where enforcement "would work a substantial injustice," but such an inquiry may be made only where there has been a significant passage of time or
change in circumstances between execution of the agreement and the time enforcement is sought. PRINCIPLES,supra note 212, § 7.07(2); see also Bix, supra note 224,
at 237-39.
228 UNIF. PREMARITALAGREEMENTACT § 6(b), 9C U.L.A. 49 (2001).
If a provision of a premarital agreement modifies or eliminates spousal
support and that modification or elimination causes one party to the agreement to be eligible for support under a program of public assistance at the
time of separation or marital dissolution, a court, notwithstanding the
terms of the agreement, may require the other party to provide support to
the extent necessary to avoid that eligibility.
Id.
229 See Atwood, supra note 208, at 147-48 (criticizing UPAA "eligibility for public
assistance" test for insufficiently protecting long-time homemakers who may have
sufficient skills to earn a minimum wage but will be unable to maintain their current
lifestyle under terms of the agreement).
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malizing these agreements such that premarital contracts are
considered presumptively enforceable absent irregularities in
formation.

Suggestions for a Formation-Based Analysis of
Noncompetes: Assessing the Quality of Bargain
and Exchange

C.

A formation-based analysis comparable to that recognized in
the premarital agreement context can provide an alternative approach to assessing enforceability of noncompete agreements.
As previously noted, because the distinguishing attribute of such
an approach is its focus on the events surrounding the creation of
the agreement, it is closer to a true contract analysis under which
the parties' bargain is necessarily enforceable absent specific defenses such as duress or unconscionability. 230 However, the formation-based
approach contemplated
here goes beyond
confirmation of bargain and exchange to a qualitative review of
circumstances at the point of agreement. The inherent problem
with noncompetes is that the parties' inability to define precisely
their future obligations makes them unlikely to bargain seriously
over contractual specifics or, from the perspective of the employee, to view the written agreement as the final arbiter of the
terms of his or her relationship. 231 Courts must therefore examine more rigorously issues of consideration and assent to determine whether the parties' agreement can be treated as a fair
and consensual allocation of future risks. That goal may be accomplished by closely investigating at least three broad aspects of
the formation process: the ability of the employee to bargain regarding the agreement's terms, the appropriateness of the scope
of the restraint as of the time of formation, and the consideration
provided by the employer in exchange for the noncompete.
The first aspect of this form of review contemplates an examination of the bargaining process itself to determine whether the
employee has given meaningful consent to the noncompete. Fear
of unequal power relationships has long motivated court decisions, yet the current legal test based on the protectable interest
requirement does not provide for direct examination of the bargaining process, nor would an approach focusing purely on sub230
231

See supra Part IV.B.
See supra Part III.Cl.
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stantive effects of enforcement. 232 Under a formation-based
model of review, however, courts would consider the process by
which the agreement was reached in order to determine whether
the employee legitimately assumed the risk that the noncompete's terms would prove onerous.
In executing that inquiry, courts could look to many of the
same factors deemed relevant under the law of premarital agreements. The timing of the presentation of the agreement, whether
there was actual discussion or negotiation regarding its terms,
and the relative sophistication of the parties should all be relevant in determining the agreement's enforceability. A noncompete signed after the date of hire, for instance, should be
presumptively unenforceable. In such a situation, it is impossible
for the employee to assert any leverage in disputing the agreement's terms, as the employee has already terminated his or her
previous employment and done the preparation necessary to assume the new position. 233 Courts should also consider whether
the employee consulted with counsel. Although legal representation should not be a requirement, as with premarital agreements, courts can look to whether the employee was informed of
the significance of the noncompete and encouraged to have it
2 3 2 Indeed, the current approach has been criticized for emphasizing a policy of
protecting workers with unequal bargaining power but not taking actual bargaining
power into account in assessing enforceability. See, e.g., Callahan, supra note 28, at
721-22 (asserting that most employees subject to noncompetes are "highly skilled"
and "relatively sophisticated" and finding it "puzzling" that the law "protect[s) persons who are able, ex ante, to assess the desirability of the terms, who are able to
foresee the consequences of such terms, and who are free not to contract if the terms
are sufficiently unfavorable"); cf Sterk, supra note 31, at 409 (observing that "[i)f
unequal bargaining power were the only reason for refusing to enforce restrictive
covenants, one would expect full enforcement in those cases where sophisticated
parties, negotiating at arms length and with the assistance of counsel, bargained for
restrictive covenants"); see also Lester, supra note 3, at 60-61 (describing current
approach to bargaining power issue as "inconsistent" in that courts "pay[) lipservice
to policing inequality of bargaining power, ... [but) routinely analyze covenants
alone, paying scant attention to the actual bargaining power of the parties").
233 See, e.g., Flexcon Co. v. McSherry, 123 F. Supp. 2d 42, 44 (D. Mass. 2000)
(noting in refusing to grant preliminary injunction against competition that employee signed noncompete as part of "routine paperwork" three days after commencing employment and neither offer letter nor letters regarding subsequent
promotion mentioned covenant); Corroon & Black of Nashville, Inc. v. Lee, 1984
Tenn. App. LEXIS 2695, at *4-5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 1984) (refusing enforcement of noncompete signed two weeks into employment in conjunction with related
employment forms where employee had numerous preemployment discussions with
employer regarding details of employment that did not include mention of
noncompete ).
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independently reviewed, such agreements being presumptively
valid where the employee was educated as to the effect of the
commitment and chose to sign it anyway. 234 Ultimately, this
analysis should focus on all factors that indicate whether the employee had a real opportunity to alter or reject the agreement's
terms, including the employer's amenability to negotiation and
the extent of the employee's bargaining power. An unemployed
individual signing a boilerplate agreement should be viewed differently from a highly skilled worker voluntarily leaving a position to assume a new job whose terms are negotiable. 235
In addition to looking at the quality of the employee's consent
from a procedural perspective, courts should also review the
terms of the agreement itself. The second aspect of the formation-based approach to enforceability proposed here is an inquiry
into the appropriateness of the restraint, which, like the UPAA's
approach to substantive review, occurs as of the time of agree234 See , e.g. , Retina Servs., Ltd . v. Garoon , 538 N.E.2d 651, 651-52, 655 (Ill. App .
Ct. 1989) (finding agreement enforceable against defendant-ophthalmologist who
signed three prior negotiated agreements with employer while represented by counsel and consulted a reputed expert in medical noncompete agreements prior to signing agreement sought to be enforced against him); Maltby v. Harlow Meyer Savage,
Inc., 637 N.Y.S.2d 110 (N .Y . App . Div. 1996) (finding agreement enforceable where
employees had option to sign noncompete in conjunction with new job with higher
salary and chose to do so after consultation with counsel) ; cf Campbell Soup Co. v.
Desatnick, 58 F. Supp. 2d 477 (D.N.J. 1999) (refusing to enjoin employer from seeking to enforce noncompete where employee, who negotiated original employment
contract under advice of counsel, had thirty-day period in which to review subsequent noncompete contract and elected not to seek representation) . But see Motion
Control Sys., Inc . v. East , 546 S.E.2d 424,425 (Va. 2001) (finding noncompete overbroad and unenforceable although employee consulted with counsel and succeeded
in proposing minor changes to agreement before signing) .
235 See, e.g., Campbell Soup Co., 58 F. Supp. 2d at 479-81 ( denying senior executive's motion to enjoin enforcement of noncompete against him where employee
negotiated terms of origin al contract of employment and successfully refused
noncompete pursuant to advice of counsel, but subsequently signed new contract
containing noncompete two years later without making significant effort to renegotiate agreement) ; Habif, Arogeti & Wynne, P.C. v. Baggett , 498 S.E.2d 346, 350 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1998) (holding agreement enforceable against managing partner who "was
in a bargaining position equivalent to that of [his employer]"); Delli -Gatti v. Mansfield , 477 S.E.2d 134 (Ga . Ct. App . 1996) (holding noncompete enforceable against
physician who was able to negotiate favorable changes in vacation time and partnership opportunities under employment contract and had two other job opportunities
when she elected to enter into plaintiffs employ); cf Maltby , 637 N.Y.S.2d at 111
(finding agreement enforceable where employees "were provided with the choice of
signing the contract containing the restrictive covenant or continuing with their old
employment contract," which contained no noncompete but offered less favorable
terms of employment).
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ment. 236 Under the current legal test, reasonableness of scope,
duration, and geographic limitation is evaluated as of the time of
enforcement with little consideration of the parties' expectations
at the point at which the agreement was formed. 237 Similarly,
proposals based on enforcing relational norms or efficient outcomes would assess the appropriateness of the agreement in the
context of enforcement.2 38 However, it is the parties' initial expectations that indicate whether the agreement was intended to
be a binding long-term solution to the problem of fluctuations in
the parties' relationship over time. If the parties negotiated an
agreement that was fair under the circumstances, the agreement
should be enforceable.
In making the difficult determination as to whether a noncompete's terms were fair as of the time of agreement, the distinction
drawn between liquidated damages and penalties in the area of
contractual remedies provides a helpful analogy. Noncompetes
may be compared to stipulated damages clauses insofar as employers view them as a predetermined measure of compensation
for the premature departure of an employee. 239 Such clauses in
commercial contracts are enforceable only if they represent a
reasoned forecast of future loss where actual damages are difficult to assess. 240 They are not enforceable if they are so dispro236 UNIF. PREMARITALAGREEMENTAcr § 6(a)(2), 9C U.L.A. 49 (2001) (providing that "a premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party against whom enforcement is sought proves that ... the agreement was unconscionable when it was
executed") (emphasis added); see also supra Part IV.B.
237 See supra Part 1.8.
238 See supra Part III.C.2.
239 See Posner & Triantis, supra note 3 (suggesting that employers may use such
clauses as alternatives to liquidated damages provisions, which are often ineffective
due to capital constraints of employees). Similar comparisons have been made between stipulated damages clauses and premarital agreements. See, e.g., Recent Developments: Pennsylvania Supreme Court Rejects Substantive Review of Prenuptial
Agreements, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1399, 1402-03 (1991).
240 See Cray v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 171 (W.D.N.Y. 2001).
"[P)arties to an agreement may provide for the payment of liquidated damages upon
its breach, and such damages will be upheld if (1) the amount fixed is a reasonable
measure of the probable actual loss in the event of breach, and (2) the actual loss
suffered is difficult to determine precisely." Id. (quoting Willner v. Willner, 538
N.Y.S.2d 599, 601 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989)).
"Liquidated damages is the sum a party to a contract agrees to pay if he
breaks some promise, and which, having been arrived at by a good faith
effort to estimate in advance the actual damages that will probably ensue
from the breach, is legally recoverable as agreed damages if the breach
occurs."
Wasserman's Inc. v. Township of Middletown, 645 A.2d 100, 105-06 (N.J. 1994)
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portionate to the sustained loss as to suggest an intent to compel
performance. 241 With respect to noncompetes, the current legal
rules encourage employers to use broadly drafted standardized
forms which may be revised at the time of enforcement, but
which in the interim create strong disincentives against employee
defection. 242
To encourage the creation of more well-reasoned agreements,
courts assessing enforceability should consider whether the
agreement is actually sculpted to reflect the employer's anticipated needs for the particular job opening. Like the UPAA, such
an approach relies on the law of unconscionability in examining
the terms as of the time of drafting, but should reach beyond the
limited substantive review associated with commercial unconscionability to consider the reasonableness of terms. In conducting that inquiry, courts should consider all of the existing
reasonableness factors , including scope, duration, and geographic
limitations with the burden on the employer to prove the reasonableness of the request as of the time of formation.
One aspect of reasonableness that courts currently do not, but
should, consider directly is whether the duration of the restraint
is affected by the length of the parties' relationship. Employers
should have an obligation to make reasoned assessments of their
expected commitment from employees in relation to their
(quoting Westmount Country Club v. Kameny, 197 A.2d 379, 382 (N .J. Super. Ct .
App. Div. 1964)); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)OF CONTRACTS§ 356(1) (1981)
("Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only
at an amount that is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual loss caused
by the breach and the difficulties of proof of loss.") .
241 See Equity Enters. v. Milosch, 633 N .W.2d 662, 671-73 (Wis. Ct . App. 2001)
(noting that "[s]tipulated damages substantially in excess of injury justify an inference of ... an objectionabl e in terrorem agreement design ed to deter a party from
breaching the contract" in concluding that clause requiring payment of sum equaling
three and a half times actual loss must be "closely scrutinized" in determining enforceability on remand) ; Capricorn Sys., Inc. v. Pednekar, 546 S.E.2d 554, 558 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2001) (finding stipulated damages clause that "arbitrarily" set damages at
$50,000 unenforceable where recited amount bore "no rational relationship to actual
or potential damages " and special damages could be "easily calculated as substantially less than the liquidated damages in the contract "); Coleman v. Chamberlain &
Sons, Inc. , 766 So. 2d 427, 430 (Fla . Dist. Ct. App . 2000) (holding unenforceable
stipulated damages provision requiring former employee to pay 200% of one year's
gross revenue for each defecting client where former employer demonstrated no
actual damages and admitted purpose of clause was to penalize former employees);
RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)OF CONTRACTS§356(1) (1981) ("A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is unenforceable on grounds of public policy as a
penalty.").
242 See supra note 192 and accompanying text.

Bargaining for Loyalty in the Information Age

1239

planned investment and draft noncompetes with restraints that
diminish the longer the employee stays in his or her job, much
like a pay back agreement. 243 An agreement that does not provide for an enforceability cap based on length of service could be
deemed presumptively unreasonable. In addition, courts can enhance the reasonableness assessment by considering industry
standards relevant to the job in question, much in the way trade
usages are employed in evaluating commercial agreements. 244
Since employers find themselves on both sides of this issue, as
parties seeking to restrain departing employees and parties seeking to hire individuals subject to such restraints, courts should
defer to an apparent consensus on what constitutes the appropriate scope, duration, or area for a noncompete.
The purpose of such inquiries is to move from a regime in
which courts essentially redraft the parties' agreements based on
the circumstances at the time of enforcement to one in which the
parties make a knowing decision to have specified contractual
terms supercede some of the otherwise flexible aspects of their
implicit agreement. Thus, in assessing the reasonableness of the
noncompete, a final factor to assess should be the consideration
offered to the employee. This suggestion departs from the premarital agreement model, which treats the impending marriage
as the consideration for the agreement from the perspective of
both parties and does not inquire further into the existence of an
exchange. 245 The law of noncompetes has historically taken a
similar approach, treating the employment itself as the consideration for the employee's promise. 246 Although the employee's po24 3 For instance, Colorado's statute on restraints of trade permits employers to
enforce repayment agreements only in instances where the employee departs within
two years of hire. See Cow. REv. STAT. § 8-2-113(2)(c) (2001).
244 Cf U.C.C. § 2-202 (2001) (providing that a final written agreement may be
supplemented by usages of trade). The U.C.C. defines "usage of trade" as "any
practice or method of dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the
transaction in question." Id. § 1-205(2).
245 See In re Marriage of Barnes, 755 N.E.2d 522, 527 (111.App. Ct. 2001); Lieberman v. Lieberman, 587 N.Y.S.2d 107, 109 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) ("[P)remarital agreements are entered into in contemplation of marriage and the consideration for the
agreement is the marriage itself."); cf UNIF. PREMARITAL
AGREEMENTAcr § 2, 9C
U.L.A. 41 (2001) ("A premarital agreement must be in writing and signed by both
parties. It is enforceable without consideration.").
246 See, e.g., Garcia v. Laredo Collections, Inc., 601 S.W.2d 97, 98-99 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1980) ("When the execution of a covenant not to compete is contemporaneous
with the acceptance of employment, the latter becomes the consideration for the
covenant.").
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sition may be at-will, courts have taken the view that continued
employment up to the point at which enforcement is sought creates sufficient after-the-fact consideration, to support the employee's earlier promise not to compete. 247
If courts are to consider the reasonableness of the noncompete
and the quality of the employee's consent, however, they must to
some extent take account of what the employee was offered in
exchange for that agreement. Where there is a written contract
of employment, of employment that assure some form of job security, such as a fixed term or for-cause discharge provision,
could create the presumption of a fair agreement. 248 However,
where the parties enter into an at-will relationship, courts should
look to see what, if anything, the employee was offered beyond
the mere opportunity to perform the job. Such an inquiry would
merely require that the terms of the at-will arrangement suggest
that the employee's decision to accept the agreement was a reasoned one. Such terms could include the award of a signing bonus for those employees accepting the agreement, higher wages
than what is generally offered for such a position in the relevant
market, or the promise of job-related training or opportunities
247 See Coastal Unilube, Inc. v. Smith, 598 So. 2d 200, 201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1992) (finding sufficient consideration to support noncompete where at-will salesman worked less than one year after signing agreement); Brignull v. Albert, 666
A.2d 82, 84 (Me. 1995) (finding sufficient consideration to support noncompete
where optometrist worked three years after signing agreement); Copeco, Inc. v. Caley, 632 N.E.2d 1299, 1301 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (finding sufficient consideration to
uphold noncompetes where at-will copy machine salesmen worked two years after
signing agreements before resigning to start competing company) ; see also supra
note 16. In instances in which the agreement is requested long after employment is
commenced, however , some courts require that the employee receive some increase
in compensation, authority, or benefits to support the employee's promise. See, e.g.,
Freeman v. Duluth Clinic, Ltd. , 1334 N.W.2d 626,630 (Minn. 1983) (finding invalid
noncompete agreement signed two years after beginning employment and months
after a new promotion because no new consideration such as a pay raise, new promotion, or other benefit was offered to employee physician).
248 Existing case law suggests that courts are more inclined to enforce noncompetes in situations where the employer offers reciprocal benefits under a formal contract. See , e.g. , Maltby v. Harlow Meyer Savage , Inc., 637 N.Y.S.2d 110, 111 (N.Y.
App . Div. 1996) (finding agreement enforceable where employer offered employees
new contract providing more job security and higher salary than employees received
in their previous positions) ; cf Becker v. Blair , 361 N.W.2d 434 (Minn. Ct. App .
1985) (enforcing employee 's promise to repay training costs pursuant to fixed-term
employment agreement); Corroon & Black of Nashville, Inc. v. Lee, 1984 Tenn.
App. LEXIS 2695, at *5-8 (Tenn . Ct. App. Feb. 16, 1984) (distinguishing cases in
which employee was promised term employment or notice prior to discharge in refusing to enforce noncompete signed by at-will employee after commencing
employment).
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for skills development. 249 As apparent from the last of these
nonexhaustive examples, this inquiry may consider some of the
factors relevant to the protectable interest inquiry. However, the
focus of the inquiry is not the employer's need for protection but
whether the terms of the employment offer justify the risk to the
employee. 250
The preceding suggestions illustrate how a formation-based inquiry might affect the determination of a noncompete's enforceability. Like the current test and other proposals for reform, the
formation-based model has a number of limitations. It cannot
guarantee just results for every employee or eliminate the problem of unpredictable results. In addition, the formation-based
model focuses on the competing interests of employer and employee and gives limited regard to third party concerns, such as
the public's interest in freely accessing an employee's services. 251
249 While such factors are not formally part of the existing legal inquiry, such considerations clearly compel many court decisions, particularly where the employee is
highly compensated. See, e.g., Retina Servs., Ltd. v. Garoon, 538 N.E.2d 651 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1989) (noting in enforcing noncompete that employee's 1987 negotiated
contract provided for compensation in excess of $300,000 plus $50,000 in fringe benefits); EMC Corp. v. Allen, No. 97-5972-B, 1997 WL 1366836 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec.
15, 1997) (noting in enforcing noncompete that employee was compensated with an
annual salary of approximately one million dollars including bonuses and stock options); cf Flexcon v. McSherry, 123 F. Supp. 2d 42, 44 (D. Mass. 2000) (noting in
denial of employer's request for injunction that defendant's job was not "as highpowered, well-compensated or international as job" in precedent case which found
noncompete enforceable).
250 Texas courts have adopted an approach consistent with this suggestion. By
statute, noncompetes in Texas are unenforceable unless "ancillary to or part of an
otherwise enforceable agreement at the time the [noncompete] agreement is made."
TEx. Bus. & CoM. CODE § 15.50 (Vernon Supp. 2002). Because courts have held
that the commencement of an at-will employment relationship does not constitute
an "otherwise valid agreement," where an employer seeks to enforce a noncompete
against a worker with no job security, it must establish a separate consideration for
the restraint, such as an express promise to provide specialized training. See, e.g.,
Light v. Centel Cellular Co., 883 S.W.2d 642, 644-45 (Tex. 1994). Presumably, this
means that the employer's failure to provide the promised consideration would be
actionable and could excuse the employee's compliance with the terms of the postemployment restraint. See id. at 626 (suggesting that employer's promise to provide
training in an agreement containing a noncompete clause would be enforceable
against the employer regardless of the duration of the parties' employment
relationship).
251 The Restatement version of the current doctrinal test for enforceability nominally precludes enforcement of noncompetes where "the promissee's need [for an
injunction] is outweighed by the hardship to ... the public [at large]." RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OF CONTRACTS§188 (1981). However, in administering the rule of
reason, few courts directly consider the public interest as a factor distinct from the
effect of the agreement on the employee himself or herself. See supra note 37 and
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The analysis offered here, however, does not preclude development of additional defenses to enforcement or application of
other sources of law designed to protect either the contracting
parties or the public. 252 What the formation-based approach offers is a preliminary compromise between treating noncompete
agreements as ordinary contracts and subjecting them to outright
review for substantive fairness to the employee based on
postformation effects. The approach aims not at prescribing appropriate terms for a given employment relationship, but rather
at ensuring that the contract vehicle is used responsibly. The formation-based model encourages employers to use discretion in
requesting these agreements and attempts to provide employees
with an opportunity to review and to question them. The ultimate goal is to enforce those noncompetes that are entered into
with recognition of their distinct legal consequences, and avoid
accompanying text. This omission is consistent with the view expressed by some that
despite rhetoric regarding the harsh societal effects of restraints on trade, the anticompetitive effects of individual employee noncompete agreements are negligible.
See , e.g., Sterk , supra note 31, at 406-08 ; Callahan , supra note 28, at 712-18 . On the
other hand, if the public interest is an important concern , but is omitted from the
existing inquiry on the assumption that policing reasonableness effectively eliminates third party effects, it may be necessary to supplement the formation-based
model of enforcement with an exception that captures those cases in which unique
facts suggest that enforcement will unduly burden the public, for instance where a
noncompete will deprive a small community of its physician.
252 For instance , it may be useful to consider how doctrines such as impossibility
could apply to protect employees in situations where unforeseeable changes in the
market or other unexpected circumstances render noncompetition impracticable
under the terms of the agreement. The possibility of such an application is suggested by the ALI approach to premarital agreement enforcement, which permits a
limited defense where there has been a significant and unanticipated change in circumstances and enforcement would work a substantial injustice. See PRINCIPLES,
supra note 212, § 7.07(2); see also supra note 233.
With respect to third party interests, a lingering question remains the extent to
which federal antitrust law might apply to prohibit certain noncompete agreements.
Some scholars and commentators have argued that the antitrust regime may be an
appropriate tool for policing the aggregate effect of such agreements on particular
industries from a public perspective , in contrast to state law which concentrates primarily on the balance of interests between the individual employer and employee.
See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 5, at 647-50; Note , The Anritrust Implications of Employ ee Noncompete Agreements: A Labor Market Analysis, 66 MINN . L. REv. 519,
546-49 (1982). Courts, however, have thus far been reluctant to embrace such an
approach. See, e.g., Borg-Warner Protective Servs . Corp . v. Guardsmark , Inc. , 946
F . Supp . 495, 498-500 (E.D. Ky. 1996) (finding it " impossible , as a matter of law,
for ... employees to provide the plurality of actors imperative for a § l conspiracy "
under the Sherman Act because employees "did not have an independent personal
stake ... [or] stand to benefit from conspiring to restrain trade").
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those that serve merely as placeholders guaranteeing the employer a judicially crafted remedy.
CONCLUSION

This Article has advocated a formation-based approach to
noncompete enforceability in recognition of the mounting problem of unpredictable and inconsistent case results and the disconnect between the current legal test and employers' interest in
employee retention. Existing law strives to maintain an historical
distinction between the use of noncompetes to protect narrowly
defined business interests and the impermissible use of noncompetes that restrain individual workers, a distinction that proves
unworkable in many modern contexts. The excess of reported
decisions, and the confusion they demonstrate, is attributable in
part to inherent difficulties in crafting and applying a definition
for confidential business information. It is also due to the fact
that in some instances employers have a legitimate interest in retaining workers who are themselves important business assets.
A central concern of the Article has therefore been achieving
an alternative approach to enforceability that abandons the protectable interest concept without abandoning the underlying
principles that support some judicial intervention to protect
workers. The problem with the current approach, and many existing proposals for reform, is that its focus on the after-the-fact
effects of the agreement increases the uncertainty of enforcement, undermines freedom of contract, and eliminates any incentives for employers to craft these agreements with care. Even
where the employee has bargaining power, there is unlikely to be
negotiation over the terms of a noncompete in a legal regime
where courts will reinterpret or rewrite the agreement in light of
future events. If the law of premarital agreements is any indication, a better approach may be to invite judicial scrutiny of the
formation process as opposed to the consequences of enforcement. Such an approach treats noncompetes as contracts and reviews them in accordance with basic contract principles, but
requires greater scrutiny of contractual formalities than would be
expected in a typical commercial exchange. Whether such an approach could be useful in evaluating other unilaterally imposed
terms in employment contracts may well be an issue worth exploring in future research. 253 At least with respect to noncom253

For example, one potentially fruitful area of inquiry may be the applicability of
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petes, by evaluating the quality of the employee's consent, both
in terms of the process by which agreement is reached and the
terms of the parties' exchange, courts may achieve a fairer and
more consistent balance between preserving employers' right to
contract and protecting employees from the effects of burdensome terms.

a formation-based analysis to contractual agreements to arbitrate future employment disputes, including federal discrimination claims. Since the Supreme Court's
1991 decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991),
which held that such arbitration agreements are enforceable subject to ordinary contract defenses, lower courts have consistently enforced such arbitration agreements
provided the employee had some minimal awareness of the existence of the arbitration clause and there is no showing of fraud or duress. See, e.g., Seus v. John
Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 183-84 (3d Cir. 1998). Some have criticized this approach , however, as failing to account sufficiently for the inequality in the parties'
respective bargaining positions and have suggested that employee consent to such
agreements is insufficiently informed to constitute a voluntary waiver of the procedural rights afforded under federal employment legislation . See, e.g., Eileen Silverstein, From Statute to Contract: The Law of the Employment Relationship
Reconsidered, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 479, 512-24 (2001) . Whether the principles espoused in this piece could form the basis for a more nuanced approach to
analyzing the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate is a question for further analysis that is beyond the scope of the Article.

